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How good can bad leaders be? The opportunity costs of leader selection 
 
Abstract  
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Research on leader emergence has mainly been driven by the aspiration to identify good 
leaders, and, most importantly, decode the behaviours and traits associated with outperforming 
leaders (Day, Fleenor, Atwater, Sturm, & McKee, 2014). As a consequence, most scholars 
have focused on the traits and the behaviours, such as personality, intelligence, 
transformational leadership style that explain why certain individuals emerge as leaders or why 
some leaders are better than others (e.g., Antonakis, House, & Simonton, 2017; Arvey, 
Rotundo, Johnson, Zhang, & McGue, 2006; Judge & Piccolo, 2004). Some leadership scholars 
have even focused on the evolutionary origins of contemporary leadership, such as why tall 
men are preferred over short men for leadership positions (Van Vugt & Ahuja, 2010). Others 
– a minority – have chosen a different approach and focus on what characterizes bad leaders, 
articulating theories of destructive leadership (Einarsen, Aasland, & Skogstad, 2007) or laissez-
faire leadership (Judge & Piccolo, 2004). Overall, leadership scholars have provided an 
abundance of evidence to inform leadership selection and training.  
However, most of the previous research has been operating under the implicit 
assumption that a group always benefits from selecting the best leader. For instance, Schyns 
and Schilling (2013:138) noted that “research into leadership has often been guided by the 
quest to find the most effective person or method to lead”. One consequence of this assumption 
is that the presence of underperforming leaders at key positions is a failure of the selection 
process as it reduces the fitness of the group. In this paper we present a theoretical approach to 
leader selection challenging the common assumption that selecting underperforming leaders is 
a mistake. Building on the logic of comparative advantage (Ricardo, 1817), we explain why 
selecting underperforming leaders may be beneficial for an organization. We argue that the 
process of leader selection should consider both leadership and followership abilities, because 
the appointment of a leader within a group implies that the leader at least reduces follower 
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activities. More specifically, in situations where the best leaders also happen to be the best 
followers, it may be optimal for the group to select an underperforming leader in order to avoid 
losing the best follower.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The next section reviews the 
existing literature on bad leaders. We then outline the basic features of our leadership model, 
before extending it to different organizational contexts and discussing how characteristics of 
the environment affect optimal leader selection. Finally, we illustrate how leader selection 
processes should be designed to maximize group efficiency, before concluding and discussing 
the implications of the proposed theory for research and practice.  
II. Leader selection 
Good and bad leaders 
A large part of the leadership literature has focused on identifying the traits and 
behaviours that make a leader efficient. For instance, intelligence (Judge, Colbert, & Ilies, 
2004) is a universally endorsed leadership trait (Den Hartog, House, Hanges, Ruiz-Quintanilla, 
& Dorfman, 1999), relevant for predicting leadership emergence nonetheless it has been shown 
to have a curvilinear effect on performance and follower satisfaction (Antonakis et al., 2017). 
Likewise, leadership styles such as transformational (Bass, 1999; Bass & Avolio, 1994) or 
charismatic leaderships (House & Howell, 1992; Howell & Avolio, 1992). are typically found 
to be beneficial for the followers and their organization. Although essential, this stream of 
research has a rather narrow focus in that it only investigates the positive side of the coin. In 
fact, there is a tendency in the leadership literature to distance leaders from negative behaviours 
and outcomes. For instance, bad leadership is typically explained through an individual’s 
negative traits, such as arrogance and ambition (McCall and Lombardo, 1983), being 
authoritarian and narcissistic (House & Howell, 1992; Malcolm Higgs, 2009), unethical 
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(Howell & Avolio, 1992), or poor practices and a lack of skills (Conger, 1990). While research 
on bad leaders is similar to the typical research on the positive aspects of leadership, these 
negative traits and behaviours are often excluded from the definitions of leadership (Schyns & 
Schilling, 2013). As a consequence, leadership research has distanced itself from bad 
leadership by focusing on positive aspects and defining leadership through positive behaviours 
or outcomes (see also Yukl & van Fleet, 1992). Moreover, what is categorized as “bad 
leadership” encompasses many different behaviours, ranging from destructive (e.g., Einarsen, 
Aasland, & Skogstad, 2007) to incompetent (see Kellerman, 2004) leadership. Although both 
destructive and incompetent leaders are inefficient, they can have very different impacts on 
their followers. More concerning, while research focused on identifying the competencies that 
make great leaders, several scholars pointed out that there is a mismatch between what research 
is saying and what is observed in practice. According to a survey conducted by Gallup, 69% 
of a sample of 1’000 German employees reported having at least one bad manager in their 
career (State of the Global Workplace, 2017). This is further corroborated by Artz, Goodall, 
and Oswald (2020) who found that about 13% of employees in Europe report having a “bad 
boss”. While this only reflects the appreciation of employees and does not directly constitute a 
valid measure of the effectiveness of these leaders, it points to the fact that leaders might not 
always perform at the expected level and raises the question of why organizations would select 
underperforming leaders. Yet, these findings are in line with earlier results from Erickson, 
Shaw, and Agabe (2007) who conducted a survey about the prevalence of bad leadership. Out 
of 335 respondents, only 24.8% reported having a good leader, 37.6% reported having an 
average leader, and 37.4% described their leader as bad. In addition, the reason why they 
reported having a bad leader has little to do with a lack of positive traits nor the presence of 
negative ones as research suggests, but rather with how efficient they are: respondents reported 
that their leader was “unable to deal effectively with subordinates” (p. 35). Finally, the 
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leadership literature describes bad leaders as a mistake, which in principle should not be 
sustainable. However, the respondents frequently reported that their bad leaders were either 
rewarded or even promoted.  
Several theories have been proposed to explain the emergence of underperforming 
leaders. In particular, one mechanism suggests that individuals use implicit theories to make 
their decisions (Foti, Fraser, & Lord, 1982; Lord, Foti, & De Vader, 1984). Individuals share a 
common set of beliefs or stereotypes about what traits and behaviours leaders should have in a 
given situation and select the individuals that display those traits and behaviours. For example, 
in times of instability, such as war, individuals exhibiting masculine traits are preferred to those 
with more feminine traits (Little, Burriss, Jones, & Roberts, 2007). Although inferential 
processes assume that individuals perceive some traits and behaviours as prototypical of good 
leadership, these traits and behaviours often fall short of predicting leader efficiency. In fact, 
there is no empirical evidence supporting the assumption that selecting a masculine leader 
instead of a feminine leader in times of war is associated with higher chances of success. 
Likewise, cues such as attractiveness (Antonakis & Dalgas, 2009), and height or age (Elgar, 
2016) have been found to predict leader emergence, but add little for leader effectiveness. 
Therefore, implicit theories may fall short in selecting efficient leaders because of a mismatch 
between our evolved leadership psychology and the contemporary practice of leaders, as 
societies evolved much faster than genes (Wilson, Van Vugt, & O'Gorman, 2008).  
Other scholars, like Zehnder, Herz, and Bonardi (2017), have suggested that bad leaders 
might emerge because of a mismatch between the individuals who have an incentive to lead 
and those who are good at leading. Considering that leadership is a public good game where 
leading is costly (e.g. it involves additional risk, time investment, etc.), the authors suggest that 
bad leaders could emerge because “personality characteristics that have been identified with 
good leadership (vision, charisma, confidence, etc.) are not necessarily identical with those 
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that induce people to step up (such as need for power or career concerns)” (p. 19). This view 
therefore explains the emergence of bad leaders through a mismatch between the competencies 
required to be an efficient leader and the motivations individuals have to take on leadership 
positions. 
Overall, these theories of leader emergence have built a comprehensive framework to 
understand how inefficient leaders might be selected. Yet, most scholarship is built around the 
key assumption that selecting underperforming leaders is a mistake. While it is likely that poor 
leadership is sometimes the result of failures in the selection process, we would like to offer a 
complementary explanation. In particular, we propose to look at leader selection through the 
lenses of role allocation. Role allocation suggests that different roles are allocated to different 
individuals to achieve a common goal. Framing leading and following as roles, it appears that 
when an individual takes over the role of leader, she abandons her role of follower. We 
therefore argue that leader selection should not only be driven by the evaluation of leadership 
traits and competencies, but also by the evaluation of followership competencies that will be 
lost when one individual is selected to act as leader. By framing leader selection as a role 
allocation, we investigate the opportunity costs a group faces when it selects an individual for 
a leadership position. 
The opportunity cost of leader selection 
Leaders are often defined through their competencies (e.g., Day et al., 2014; Luthans 
& Avolio, 2003; Shamir, House, & Arthur, 1993), or through the perception of their followers 
(e.g., Bligh, Kohles, & Meindl, 2004; Meindl, 1995; Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985). 
“Leadership” can therefore be defined through its relational aspect, that is, the “process that 
occurs between a leader and a follower, groups of followers, or institutions” (Antonakis & Day, 
2017, p.5). At the core of this definition resides the essence of what constitutes leadership: the 
interaction between a leader and her followers (Lord & Brown, 2001). In order to model this 
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relationship, we consider a group composed of 𝑛 individuals. Naturally, individuals can vary 
in terms of competencies, both in leadership and in followership. For example, an individual 
might be excellent at crafting and sharing a vision but perform poorly when it comes to 
following orders, while still being better than other followers in one or both of these 
dimensions. For simplifications purposes, we define the competencies of an individual 𝑖 by 
how much output this individual can produce. Individuals either follow (𝑓𝑖) or lead (𝑙𝑖). The 
output of the group may then be thought of as an aggregated measure of performance, where 
the leader fosters the productivity of the followers. The production function of the group can 
be represented by the sum of the performance of the followers (noted j), enhanced by the 
competencies of their leader (noted i):  




Our definition of group production answers the call for a better integration of 
followership in the leadership literature (Bligh, 2011; Uhl-Bien, Riggio, Lowe, & Carsten, 
2014) by framing group production as an interaction between the outputs of the leader and the 
output of followers. Our model relies on several assumptions. First, we focus on situations in 
which there is a necessity for a leader, so that one member must fulfil the leadership position. 
Second, we assume that leading and following are mutually exclusive roles: the leader cannot 
perform followers’ duties at the same time as she fulfills her leadership duties. However, this 
assumption is made for simplicity only and will later be relaxed when we discuss the possibility 
for part-time leading. Finally, we presume that the performance of the leader and her followers 
is perfectly observed, and that competencies are fully realized. This assumption allows for a 
clear identification of individual outputs, which will prove useful for selecting the best leader 
for a given group. We will later also relax this assumption in order to discuss how to select 
leaders when competencies are hard to observe. 
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Although traditional leadership research would suggest only looking at the leadership 
competencies for leader selection, allocating mutually exclusive roles to individuals bears the 
same opportunity costs as any other limited resource allocation: it is crucial to consider both 
gained competencies as well as those forgone. To illustrate this point, we can imagine a team 
of two individuals. One of the individuals has to be selected as a leader, while the other one 
will be a follower. In order to make an informed decision, we need to consider their respective 
competencies in both roles: while individual 1 has excellent skills as a follower and as a leader, 
individual 2 is generally an average performer. These competences are summarized in Table 1.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
In this example, although individual 1 is the most competent leader, her higher 
competencies are not sufficient to cover the loss of her performance as a follower. In other 
words, in order to select the best leader for a given group, it is not enough to only evaluate 
leadership competencies. The optimal allocation of roles therefore depends on the relative 
advantage of one individual over the other. Indeed, assigning individual 1 to the leadership or 
followership position does not only depend on her own skills, but also on the skills of individual 
B and, therefore, how well the group as a whole would perform under the two different 
compositions1. Although employees are often referred to as “human resources”, to the best of 
 
1 This is similar to the notion of comparative advantage (Ricardo, 1817). While initially 
written to explain why it can be efficiency enhancing if countries specialize in a free-trade 
world even if some countries are systematically less productive than others. One of the main 
reasons why the theory of comparative advantage holds is because countries have finite 
resources. When a country invests resources to produce one type of good it cannot reuse the 
same resources to produce another type of good. Countries should therefore specialize in 
products for which they have a comparative advantage. By drawing on Ricardo’s model, we 
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our knowledge leader selection has only been studied without considering the opportunity costs 
of removing an individual from his responsibilities as a follower. In this paper, we depart from 
the common view on leader selection, which argues that the best leader should be selected, and 
propose a different perspective emphasizing the opportunity costs of becoming a leader (i.e., 
not being a follower). We therefore propose to shift the perspective of selection from the 
individual to the group. However, the trade-off between appointing a leader and losing a 
follower relies on three elements. First, we discuss the importance of the correlation between 
leadership and followership competencies. Then, we consider the impact of two contextual 
elements on leader selection and follower performance: importance and time-intensity of 
leadership.   
Are good followers good leaders? 
Although it is commonly assumed that followership performance is a good predictor of 
leadership performance, it is not always true. In fact, it is not unusual for the two roles to require 
very different sets of skills. For instance, a production plant may use machines as followers, as 
they can screw parts every 2 seconds, while a human leader is unable to achieve the same 
performance as the machines but is able to monitor them. In that case, the correlation between 
the competencies that make a good follower or an efficient leader is null at best, and may even 
be negative. In other words, being good at following is not predictive of being good at 
leadership. In fact, the machine will always perform followership tasks while the human will 
always perform leadership tasks, even when accounting for opportunity costs. Nevertheless, 
there are less extreme examples. In hospitals, the qualities characterizing excellent doctors are 
not necessarily the same qualities associated with being a good manager. The correlation 
between followership and leadership skills in this context will be low. Similarly, top rank 
 
argue that organizations too have finite resources and should therefore exploit the logic 
behind the theory of comparative advantages. 
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military officers have little in common with field troopers. Ultimately, when the best followers 
are not the best leaders, opportunity costs become irrelevant as an organization would not select 
an excellent follower as the leader. Understanding how followership and leadership skills tend 
to be correlated in a specific context is highly important to assess whether opportunity costs 
are important to optimize the performance of the group.  
Of course, if the correlation between leadership and followership competencies is low, 
so that the best leader happens to be the worst follower, then the opportunity costs will be 
irrelevant. In this specific case, selecting the most competent leader is optimal for the group, 
as selecting any other leader would increase the opportunity costs as their followership 
competencies would be at least partially lost. However, if leadership and followership 
competencies are positively correlated, then the opportunity costs become relevant and the 
group may face a trade-off between the competencies of their leader and the overall production 
of the group. 
Contextual importance the leader and part-time leadership 
While leaders are commonly acknowledged to be generally important, there are 
contexts in which they either have less influence on a groups’ performance (Weierter, 1997) or 
must perform different tasks than the ones inherent to their leadership position. In some 
instances, the leader will have only a marginal effect on group output while in other instances 
her role may be critical for the group’s output. This last point becomes salient if we consider, 
for example, the role of a boat captain. When the boat is anchored in the harbour, the 
importance of the leader on her group is relatively low. Most sailors go about their duties 
independently, performing simple maintenance and supply tasks. On the contrary, when the 
boat is at sea going through a storm, the importance of the leader for the group is high. While 
in many situations the captain’s competencies are crucial to coordinate the sailors, under some 
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circumstances the captain’s role is not very different from the sailors’. In our model, the 
contextual importance of the leader (𝛼) therefore acts as a moderator of the leader’s influence 
on her followers’ performance. However, if in a given context leadership does not matter at all 
(𝛼 = 0), the production of the group will simply be the performance of the followers. While 
the leader acts as a catalyst of the followers’ production, we allow her role to vary between not 
being needed and infinitely enhancing her followers’ production (0 ≤ 𝛼 < ∞).  In addition, we 
extend the model to allow the leader to spend a proportion (1 − 𝛽) of her time leading, while 
she spends the rest (𝛽) performing as a follower. Consequently, the performance of the 
followers also contains the performance of the leader as a follower for the proportion of her 
time she does not spend leading (𝛽). As an individual is constrained to a fixed amount of time, 
the proportion of time she spends leading cannot exceed 100% nor be below 0% (0 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 1 ). 
The production function of a group where individual 𝑖 is leading can, thus, be expressed as 
follows (see Appendix for the complete steps): 




The contextual importance of leadership essentially increases the benefits of selecting 
a skilled leader: the more important the leadership, the highest the competencies of the leader 
should be. Conversely, the time required to be spent on followership tasks has the opposite 
effect, as it increases the costs of losing a follower, and therefore reduces the relevance of 
leadership skills. To illustrate the main features of the model, we consider four extreme cases 
for the contextual importance of leadership and the time spent leading.  
Unnecessary, full-time leader (𝜶 = 𝜷 = 𝟎). Although a leader is required, her 
competencies are not used for the production in this context. The production function is 
impacted as follows: 
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Therefore, appointing a leader only removes a follower from the team, as she will spend all of 
her time on useless, yet mandatory activities. In conclusion, the choice of individual that will 
maximize the production function is the one that yield the lowest opportunity cost: the follower 
with the lowest competencies. However, if leadership and followership competencies are 
positively correlated, then this will result in selecting a leader with low competencies. 
Important, absent leader (𝜶 = 𝜷 = 𝟏). As leadership is contextually important, but 
does not prevent the leader from performing as a follower, there are no costs to appointing a 
leader: 




As a consequence, the most competent leader can be selected without any opportunity costs, 
irrespective of the correlation between leadership and followership competencies.  
Important, full-time leader (𝜶 = 𝟏;  𝜷 = 𝟎). When leadership is contextually 
important and takes all of the time available, the opportunity costs of appointing a leader are at 
their highest:  




Although leadership is crucial, the selected individual will no longer be able to perform as a 
follower. If leadership and followership competencies are positively correlated, then selecting 
the most competent leader will also yield a large loss of production. However, if the correlation 
   
13 
 
is negative, then the trade-off is no more as competent leaders are not the most competent 
followers. 
Unnecessary, absent leader (𝜶 = 𝟎;  𝜷 = 𝟏). If leadership is contextually useless, and 
does not take any time, then there are no opportunity costs at all:  




In this case, notwithstanding the correlation between leadership and followership 
competencies, selecting an individual yields no loss of followership performance nor use of 
leadership competencies, and selection therefore does not matter. 
Appointing an underperforming leader can therefore enhance the performance of a 
group, especially if three conditions are met. First, leadership and followership competencies 
must be positively correlated, so that a tradeoff arises from the competencies themselves. 
Second, leadership must be time-consuming, as leading reduces the leader’s performance as a 
follower. Finally, this trade-off is exacerbated when leadership is contextually less important. 
Although informative, these four cases represent the extremes of the contextual importance and 
time-intensity of leadership. We therefore further investigate the various combinations of 
values these two elements can take on, and their impact on the competencies of the selected 
leader, when leadership and followership competencies are positively correlated. At the 
extreme, in a specific context the correlation between the competencies to be a leader and the 
ones required to be a follower could be perfect (Table 2).  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
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The trade-off then depends on the combination of the contextual importance of the leadership 
and the time required to lead. The selected leader for each combination is illustrated by Figure 
1. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
The grey areas represent the individual selected as a leader for a given combination of 
importance of leadership (𝛼) and time spent as a leader (1 − 𝛽). As one could expect, and in 
line with the literature, in most cases the optimal leader for the group is the one with the highest 
leadership competencies: individual 1. However, as the time required to lead increases, the 
competencies of the optimal leader decrease. This decrease of leadership competencies is 
driven by the opportunity costs: because leadership and followership competencies are 
negatively correlated, the more time a leader spends leading, the higher the loss of performance 
as a follower. As illustrated, this is especially true when the contextual importance of leadership 
is low as well, as the impact of the leader’s competencies on the followers’ performance is 
reduced. Overall, Figure 1 shows that, while in many instances leader selection can be thought 
of as a quest for the most competent individual, selecting underperforming leaders can 
sometimes be optimal, and therefore not a mistake. Indeed, the latter cases can lead to 
organizational issues, such as followers being dissatisfied with their leader, as some of them 
are more competent than she is. However, with the bigger picture in mind, we can see that what 
really matters for leader selection is not the competencies of one individual, but the 
performance of the whole group. 
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What matters: role allocation 
We have so far argued that leader selection should not rely solely on leader 
competencies. Rather, the optimal allocation of roles depends on the trade-off between what 
the individuals can bring as leaders and what the group can lose if these individuals stop acting 
as followers. Moreover, this trade-off is sensitive to the contextual importance of leadership. 
As illustrated in the previous examples, organizations should be particularly weary of 
opportunity costs of selecting a leader when the contextual importance of leadership is low to 
moderate, leadership is time-intensive, and the correlation between leadership and followership 
competencies is negative. Indeed, selecting the best leader in those contexts without accounting 
for opportunity costs may hamper rather than maximize group output. The selection of the 
optimal leader for the group ultimately boils down to one crucial element: the trade-off between 
selecting a leader and losing that individual as a follower. However, in order to select the best 
leader, the competencies of the individuals for both roles must be known. While followership 
can be assessed through the past performance of individuals, it can be difficult to make 
projections regarding their competences as leaders, especially if they have never been in such 
a role before. In The next section we will discuss how to select leaders when the competencies 
of the individuals as followers are known but their leadership competences are unknown. 
Moreover, we discuss what organizations can do to assign the right individual to the role of a 
leader while keeping other group members motivated. 
III. How to select leaders 
Getting the right people at the right place 
In an ideal world, an organization would know the competencies of each of its 
individuals for all the roles that needs to be filled. With this information in hands, the 
organization can achieve the optimal role allocation by taking into account their opportunity 
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costs. However, it is rather uncommon for organizations to have prior knowledge of how well 
its members perform in roles that they have never held. Although the leadership literature has 
identified some of the relevant factors predicting effective leadership (e.g., Amundsen & 
Martinsen, 2014; Antonakis, 2014; Judge, Bono, Ilies, & Gerhardt, 2002; Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, Moorman, & Fetter, 1990), we argue that in practice many organizations know 
how their individuals perform as followers, due to observing their performances in the past, 
but mainly speculate when it comes to leadership competencies. Indeed, we acknowledge that 
accurately measuring leadership skills prior to becoming a leader may be difficult, therefore 
we suggest that organizations can resort to use followership competencies as a proxy for 
leadership competencies. As such, individuals with high followership competencies may also 
have high leadership abilities. Though simple, this rule of thumb is widely used in practice to 
promote individuals within the organization. In addition, promoting the best followers to 
leadership roles is also an effective extrinsic motivational tool. The idea of motivating 
individuals via promotions is at the core of tournament theory (Becker & Huselid, 1992; 
Knoeber & Thurman, 1994; Lazear & Rosen, 1981). Tournament theory posits that in order to 
motivate individuals, an organization can offer a promotion to the individual who will be the 
most performant follower. The reward that comes with the promotion provides an incentive for 
individuals to try harder and get promoted, which efficiently allows to select the top performer 
for a higher rank (assuming that the best follower is also the best leader).  
Though tournament theory is well established in both management and economics (see 
Connelly, Tihanyi, Crook, & Gangloff, 2014), we suggest that in the case of leader selection, 
it may lead to motivational issues when accounting for opportunity costs. Recall that for 
tournament theory to work, individuals must have an incentive to show the best of themselves 
and that being promoted to a leadership role is the incentive. Yet, we have so far made the case 
that, in some instances, organizations may be better off keeping top performers in followership 
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positions because of the opportunity costs arising from losing their best followers. Instead, by 
selecting underperforming individuals for leadership positions, organizations remove the 
incentive to do as best as one can in a followership position. Consequently, followers might 
not be motivated by the tournament, as performing well would lower their chances of being 
selected for a leadership role. Even worse, these individuals may have an incentive to downplay 
their competencies, in order to have a chance to be selected as the leader. By associating 
tournament theory to a selection process which accounts for opportunity costs, we pose the 
following puzzle: how can organizations ensure having the right people in the right place when 
there are no incentives to be there? 
 One way to tackle this issue would be to focus on the individuals more likely to lose 
motivation: the best followers. In order to achieve efficient selection, the organization needs to 
provide these top performers with an incentive to keep their performance high, as they are too 
valuable to be selected as leaders. In other words, these followers need to be better off 
remaining followers than they would, should they be promoted. While the classical approach 
to tournament theory assumes that individuals are motivated by a promotion to a leadership 
role, we suggest that organizations should devise incentives schemes which offset the 
importance of hierarchical promotions. Under such mechanisms, individuals should have an 
incentive to show the best of themselves in followership roles and be less attracted to leadership 
roles. Some organizations have already implemented similar incentives schemes. For example, 
in the banking sector, non-managing vice-president and president titles are commonly used to 
reward top-performing sales representatives alongside bonuses and salary increases. These 
non-managing titles serve as incentives for individuals to perform as best as they can in sales 
positions but are not attached to any leadership responsibilities. By doing so, these 
organizations created an incentive to perform well in followership roles and avoid (or at least 
postpone) the promotion of top performers sales representatives to leadership roles. In parallel, 
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individuals whose performance as follower is not high enough to be indispensable can enter a 
more traditional tournament for the leadership position. Consequently, the most performant 
followers are motivated by the rewards inherent to their follower’s position, while less 
performant ones are motivated by the promotion to the leader’s role. 
What should organizations consider when selecting a leader? 
The correlation between leader and follower competencies has an important impact for 
the essence of our model: the opportunity cost of leading. In a group, if the best individuals 
with the best followership skills also happen to have the best leadership skills, then the 
opportunity cost of selecting the most competent leader will be high. As good followers are 
also good leaders and bad followers are bad leaders, selecting a good leader removes a good 
follower from the group. Assuming the contextual importance of leadership is low, and leading 
is time-intensive, it can be optimal for the group to select an individual who is less competent 
than the most competent individual in the group in terms of leadership. Of course, the opposite 
is true when leadership and followership competencies are negatively correlated, as selecting 
the most competent leader will remove a follower with low followership competencies. In such 
a group, one can afford to select the most competent leader, as the opportunity cost of selecting 
this individual as a leader is low. In summary, our model suggests that organizations should 
consider opportunity costs when selecting leaders and that these opportunity costs will have 
varying importance depending on the relationship between followership and leadership 
competencies, but also on the contextual importance of leadership, how time-intensive leading 
is. 
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IV. General discussion 
Theoretical implications 
Our paper makes several theoretical contributions to the leadership literature First, our 
model sheds light on aspect of leader selection often overlooked: the opportunity costs. As we 
have argued, selecting an individual as a leader can prevent her from performing as a follower. 
These opportunity costs imply that under certain circumstances, it can be optimal for a group 
to select a leader who is not the most competent member of the group. The importance of 
opportunity costs suggest that scholars should either control for opportunity costs when 
examining the leader selection process or formally make the assumption that opportunity costs 
are absent from the context under scrutiny. Our model also raises the question of whether 
existing theories of leader selection remain unchanged when controlling for opportunity costs. 
Specifically, by using tournament theory, we have switched from framing followership and 
leadership as two hierarchical levels to two different roles. Tournament theory suggests that as 
some followers may be too valuable to be appointed as leaders, it is important to reward them 
accordingly in order to avoid any negative impact on their motivation. The change of paradigm 
which assumes that being a leadership position is a better condition that being in a followership 
position is challenged. In fact, the importance of opportunity costs suggests that under certain 
circumstances, organizations should grant top performers in followership positions with better 
incentives than if they were to be promoted in leadership positions. By reframing leading and 
following as two different roles, we hope to contribute to the call for a better integration of 
leadership and followership theories. Finally, we have emphasized the importance of the 
environment in discussing leader selection. By environment, we mainly refer first to the 
relationship between followership and leadership competencies, and second to the contextual 
importance and time-intensity of leadership. Although easy to overlook, these three 
environmental factors impact the selection process, and thus, the competencies of the selected 
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leader. As with opportunity costs, we suggest that scholars should be particularly weary when 
theorizing and conducting empirical research on leader selection as they may often overlook 
the contextual importance of leadership (i.e., is leadership important in the focal environment) 
and the relationship between followership and leadership competencies.   
Finally, it is worth noting that our conclusions do not depend on the functional form of 
the production function. Although our production function may only be applicable to certain 
contexts, the trade-off between the selection of a leader and the loss of a follower remains 
relevant, as individuals are a limited resource. Although Ricardo’s (1817) notion of 
comparative advantage initially described the decision of countries to specialize in the 
production and trading of certain goods, the importance of opportunity costs is widely 
acknowledged in various domains, ranging from individual effort provision decisions 
(Kurzban, Duckworth, Kable, & Myers, 2013) to public investment decisions (Marglin, 1963). 
Eventually, opportunity costs are relevant whenever one needs to decide on how to allocate 
limited resources. 
Practical implications 
Moreover, this model also has several practical implications. First, related to the last 
theoretical point, we argue that practitioners should focus more on followership competencies 
and the correlation between the latter and leadership competencies in their own context. We 
expect this correlation to vary across jobs as well as fields. In that regard, we recommend that 
future research considers examining followership measures. While the characteristics of 
followers more responsive to a leader matter, it is also crucial to understand what kind of tasks 
followers are responsible for in a given environment and how to measure their performance for 
these tasks. Accurately measuring follower performance is not only essential to evaluate the 
opportunity costs of selecting a leader, but they also provide information about the relationship 
between leadership and followership competencies. This knowledge can then be used to design 
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a more appropriate selection process. Similarly, testing for leadership competencies should not 
be limited to existing leaders as it is often the case within organizations. Instead, measuring 
leadership competencies should be done on a more systematic basis to have a clear 
understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of each group members. By generating a 
complete mapping of competences in followership and leadership roles, organizations can 
ensure that they account for opportunity costs in the leadership selection process. Second, we 
propose that it is time to challenge the idea that leaders are more important than followers and 
as a consequence, they should be rewarded more. As argued, while it is important to remunerate 
leadership enough to have an efficient tournament, excellent followers must be better off in 
their own role than in a leadership position if an organization wants to thrive. As previously 
illustrated in this paper, some organizations have already developed financial and non-financial 
incentives to reward excellent followers, such as sales representatives. These sales 
representatives benefit from a network of clients and a trust level that cannot be easily replaced 
by other individuals should they be appointed to leadership positions. Therefore, it is t crucial 
for organizations to keep their key performers motivated using a different incentives scheme 
than by simply promoting them hierarchically. This is key to using tournaments as an efficient 
selection method.   
Recommendations for future research 
As discussed in our theoretical implications, we call for more research accounting for 
opportunity costs. It is recommended that management Scholars investigate the specific 
circumstances in which opportunity costs matter the most and whether organizations already 
weight opportunity costs in the selection process. Furthermore, scholars may want to 
investigate how organizations can implement new leader selection processes accounting for 
opportunity costs. While we have discussed the specific case of tournaments, it is easy to 
imagine that selecting individuals based on opportunity costs may trigger concerns in terms of 
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perceived fairness. For example, top performing followers who are not promoted to leadership 
positions because of opportunity costs might become demotivated and suffer performance 
losses A reduced perception of the procedural fairness can lower employee motivation, 
impacting the whole selection process and its outcome. It is also possible that the selection 
process we outlined leads to lower performance appraisals for the leader, despite being optimal 
for the group. As some followers would be more competent leaders, they may perceive the 
leader as incompetent. For example, past research has shown that the evaluation of a superior 
decreases for higher levels of education of the evaluator (Artz et al., 2020). New selection 
processes should account for motivation and transparency concerns as they depart from the 
classical view that the best follower should be appointed to the leadership position regardless 
of opportunity costs. Finally, we hope that leadership scholars will consider using mathematical 
models to develop theories of leadership as these models require making clear theoretical 
assumptions and as such, may reveal unexplored avenues for future research. While Using 
mathematical models to theorize is common in economics, this practice is less prevalent in 
management. Drawing from economic theories, in this paper we have applied a simple yet, 
well-developed idea to leadership selection: groups outperform when role allocating takes into 
account opportunity costs. Thus, we answer the existing call for a better integration of 
economics to the field of leadership (Zehnder et al., 2017) and argue that scholars can develop 
existing and new theories of leadership by applying methods common practice in economics.  
Conclusion 
Our main goal was to change the preconceived idea that selecting the individuals with 
the best leadership skills is systematically the best strategy for a group. As argued, 
organizations should operationalize leader selection as a role allocation decision and consider 
the opportunity costs of promoting an individual to a leadership position. Through different 
cases, we have showed that selecting leaders who are not the most competent is not necessarily 
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a symptom of a failure in the selection process. On the contrary, we provided arguments as to 
why it is sometimes efficient for the whole group to select underperforming leaders and keep 
the most competent followers in those roles.  Surprisingly as the share of human capital became 
increasingly important in advanced economies, leadership studies remained relatively agnostic 
to the importance of opportunity costs in the leadership selection process. Omitting opportunity 
costs in leadership selection and more generally in the management of human resources is even 
more surprising considering that opportunity costs have been used to allocate capital and 
financial resources within organizations. At a time where scholars call for more integration of 
followers in leadership research (Bligh, 2011; Uhl-Bien et al., 2014) as well as building bridges 
between different research fields, we believe that following this avenue is both timely and 
relevant.   
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VI. Appendix A 
Table 1: Competencies of two individuals in role A and role B. 
Individual Follower competencies Leader competencies Group output2 
1 7 8 40 
2 5 6 42 
 
Table 2: Summary of followership and leadership competencies. 
Individual Followership output Leadership output 
1 7 1.4 
2 5 1 
3 3 0.6 
 
 
2 You can find the calculations of the group outputs hereafter. If individual 1 is the leader, the 
group’s output is 5 ∗ 8 = 40. If individual 2 is the leader, the group’s output is 7 ∗ 6 = 42. 
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Figure 1: Selected leader depending on the combinations of contextual importance and time-
intensity of leadership. 
 
VI. Appendix B 
Production function (full model) 
Starting from the basic model:  




We add the contextual importance of leadership (𝛼) as an enhancer of followership 
competencies: 
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We allow individuals to spend a proportion of their time following (𝛽), while the rest is spent 
leading (1 − 𝛽): 
𝑦 = 𝛼𝑙𝑖 (𝛽𝑓𝑖 + ∑ 𝑓𝑗
𝑛
𝑗≠𝑖




Simplifying, we obtain: 





Boundedly Ethical: How Small Misbehaviors Open the Door for More 
 
Abstract 
Despite a large body of research on (im)moral behaviors, the psychological mechanisms 
underlying moral cleansing – the act of compensating for a past misbehavior through a good 
deed – remain unclear. I propose to explain the activation of cleansing behaviors through the 
magnitude of the difference between one’s moral identity and the past misbehaviors. In order 
to test my hypotheses, I collected behavioral data in a controlled and incentivized experiment 
using MTurk (n=615) about charity donations, manipulating the extent of moral deviations 
through different degrees of temptation. Overall, I find that cleansing behaviors can be 
explained by how different an individual’s behavior is from their moral identity, although the 
reactions to the treatments are relatively small due to a majority of individuals refusing to 
provide more efforts to help the charity. I therefore conducted a type analysis, revealing that 
the difference between moral identity and misbehaviors explains moral cleansing, but also 
depends on the initial morality of the participants. 
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Individual codes of conduct are very personal and there is wide variety in the extent to 
which people engage in (im)moral behaviors. An individual’s moral identity is defined as a 
personal set of appropriate behaviors (Aquino & Reed II, 2002; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007). 
However, moral identities are not fully static and can be subject to dynamic processes. For 
instance, if individuals realizes that a past behavior is in conflict with their own moral codes, 
they tend to experience disgust (e.g., Chapman & Anderson, 2013) and may respond with moral 
cleansing. Whether literal, such as washing one’s hands (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006), or more 
abstract, such as donating money to a charity (Gneezy, Imas, & Madarász, 2014), moral 
cleansing aims at compensating for a past immoral behavior (Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009). 
However, there is anecdotal evidence showing that, under some circumstances, individuals do 
not realize that they are facing an internal moral conflict, or they do not even see the moral 
aspect of a decision they are involved in, until it is too late. 
Gioia (1992) provides an illustrative example for such moral numbness. In 1973, Gioia 
was working at Ford as recall coordinator. At that time, Ford started receiving reports of the 
Ford Pinto catching on fire after being involved in accidents at relatively low speed. However, 
these incidents were not frequent enough to “capture particular attention” (Gioia, 1992:382). 
In 1978, an investigation by the National Highway Transportation Safety Bureau concluded 
that the Pinto was faulty, and Ford was heavily criticized for carefully calculating the costs and 
benefits of recalling the Pinto without considering the moral aspect of the decision (Dowie, 
1977; Gatewood & Carroll, 1981). While the comparison of the costs of recalling the cars to 
the benefits of preventing drivers’ death is relevant from a business perspective, many people 
would agree that purely focusing on this aspect of the problem would not be in line with the 
behavior that their moral identity prescribes. If Ford’s employees were facing internal conflicts, 
why was moral cleansing not observed? 
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While the experimental study of immoral behaviors allowed to identify patterns such 
as moral cleansing, it has often neglected the importance of the perception of internal moral 
conflicts in triggering these patterns (e.g., see Effron, Cameron, & Monin, 2009; Zhong & 
Liljenquist, 2006). In fact, moral identity has been shown to be key in understanding immoral 
behaviors, as individuals often hold distorted beliefs about their own morality (Bazerman & 
Sezer, 2016; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004; Zhang, Fletcher, Gino, & Bazerman, 2015). 
However, as the literature has neglected the internal conflict between moral identity and 
behaviors, the mechanisms underlying moral cleansing remain ambiguous (Dolan & Galizzi, 
2015).   
When studying the dynamics of moral behavior, it is crucial to understand where 
behavioral deviations from one’s own moral identity come from. In the field of behavioral 
ethics, the framework of bounded ethicality explains morally inconsistent behaviors by 
assuming that individuals are naïve in that they hold incorrect beliefs regarding their capacities 
to behave morally. Most individuals overestimate how moral they are as well as their resistance 
to immoral temptation, which prevents them from seeing how certain situations can lead to 
immoral behaviors (Chugh & Bazerman, 2007; Chugh, Bazerman, & Banaji, 2005). Bounded 
ethicality, hence, assumes that individuals make systematic mistakes and fail to see that these 
mistakes make them deviate from their own moral principles (Banaji, Bazerman, & Chugh, 
2003; Banaji & Bhaskar, 2000; Bazerman & Gino, 2012; Chugh et al., 2005). 
Past experimental research mainly focused on interventions preventing misbehaviors 
(e.g., Desai & Kouchaki, 2017; Mayer, Aquino, Greenbaum, & Kuenzi, 2012), but the 
psychological mechanisms underlying misbehaviors and reactions to misbehaviors have been 
neglected. In this paper, I extend the framework of bounded ethicality and hypothesize that the 
magnitude of the deviation from the moral code is decisive for the individuals’ dynamic 
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reaction. I argue that both moral cleansing and repetition of misbehaviors can emerge 
depending on the magnitude of prior deviations from moral behavior. 
I concentrate on contexts where an individual can make the decision to prioritize 
themselves over a third party. I develop a theoretical model predicting that the behavioral 
response to previous misbehavior depends on the magnitude of the deviation from the 
individual’s own moral code. The intuition behind the model is the following: If individuals 
engage in behavior that stands in strong contrast to their moral identity, they are likely to 
consciously recognize the moral conflict and may therefore engage in moral cleansing to 
compensate their wrongdoing. Smaller deviations from their initial moral code, in contrast, 
may remain undetected and may therefore corrupt their moral identity. Consequently, small 
misbehaviors may be more dangerous than large ones, because individuals may not react to the 
former so that their moral identity depreciates over time. 
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, I extend the theoretical 
literature on bounded ethicality by proposing that reactions to own misbehaviors depend on the 
magnitude of the deviation from one’s own moral code. Second, I propose an experiment that 
allows us to directly test the central predictions of my model. This setting allows us to elicit 
behavioral measures at various stages: before, during, and after misbehaviors occurred. 
Measuring behaviors before a misbehavior allows us to capture the baseline of moral behaviors, 
which can then be compared to the misbehavior to gauge the extent to which the individual 
deviated from their moral self. Finally, I advance research on moral cleansing by using 
continuous behavioral measures. With a few exceptions (e.g., Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006), most 
of the literature on moral cleansing has been using binary measures, operationalizing cleansing 
as a probability to cleanse (e.g., Effron et al., 2009). I therefore propose to identify the different 
degrees to which individuals cleanse through continuous measures and provide evidence for 




In behavioral approaches to ethics, the past two decades have seen the rise of the 
framework of bounded ethicality (Banaji & Bhaskar, 2000; Bazerman & Gino, 2012; Bazerman 
& Tenbrunsel, 2011; Chugh & Bazerman, 2007; Chugh et al., 2005). Bounded ethicality refers 
to the “psychological processes that lead people to engage in ethically questionable behaviors 
that are inconsistent with their own preferred ethics” (Bazerman & Sezer, 2016, p. 99). The 
framework of bounded ethicality can be described as a transposition of bounded rationality 
(Simon, 1955, 1956) to the domain of morality. Echoing the seminal work of Herbert Simon, 
individuals are assumed to only be boundedly aware of their own limitations as well as the 
moral aspect of certain situations1. For instance, individuals believe they are moral and 
objective (Messick & Bazerman, 1996; Tenbrunsel, 1998). Being boundedly ethical then serves 
a self-preservation purpose – it protects the moral self (Chugh et al., 2005). However, this 
distorted self-image is exactly what prevents individuals from seeing relevant information 
when making moral decisions (Bazerman & Sezer, 2016; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004; Zhang, 
Fletcher, Gino, & Bazerman, 2015), as they tend not to see when a moral decision involves 
conflicts of interests (Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu, & Bazerman, 2006) and fail to focus on morally 
relevant information (Bazerman & Sezer, 2016; Chugh & Bazerman, 2007). While the 
framework of bounded ethicality places the moral self and moral self-image at the center of its 
explanations, it says little about the psychological mechanisms underlying misbehaviors nor 
the reaction to misbehaviors.   
Part of the psychological literature on (im)moral behaviors has focused on individuals’ 
reactions to their own misbehaviors. Indeed, for most individuals such misbehaviors come as 
 
1 While certain behavioral patterns appear to be internally inconsistent, scholars have argued 
that they may result from the application of morally neutral decision strategies to moral 
contexts and can therefore be understood by taking the environment into account (see 
Fleischhut & Gigerenzer, 2013). 
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a paradox between one’s moral identity and behavior and have to be rationalized one way or 
another (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). There are various ways through which individuals deal 
with identity conflicts ranging from psychological to behavioral. Some scholars have focused 
on how individuals detach themselves from their decisions, their outcomes, or their victims 
(e.g., Bandura, 1990, 1999, 2002; Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996), but the 
part of the literature that is most relevant for this work has focused on how individuals 
compensate for their own misbehaviors (moral cleansing2). Moral cleansing is used to describe 
the behavior of an individual who behaves morally after having behaved immorally, in order 
to compensate for the previous behavior (Sachdeva et al., 2009; Stone, Aronson, Crain, 
Winslow, & Fried, 1994; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). In line with bounded ethicality, evidence 
shows that the higher the moral self, the more likely the cleansing (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, 
Green, & Lerner, 2000). However, while moral cleansing has been experimentally observed in 
some instances (e.g., Gneezy, Imas, & Madarász, 2014), there were also several failures to 
replicate the phenomenon, indicating that the mechanism triggering the behavior has not yet 
been fully understood (Dolan & Galizzi, 2015).  
In this paper I investigate how individuals react to misbehaviors of different 
magnitudes, that is, departures from their own identity to different degrees. Drawing on the 
work of Simon on bounded rationality (1955, 1956), I propose to distinguish between salient 
and inconspicuous misbehaviors. As saliency is likely to draw attention, it may act as a stimulus 
and trigger a reaction from the individual. For example, the participants in Milgram’s (1963, 
1965) experiments on obedience to authority, faced a very salient misbehavior as they were 
instructed to punish another individual with potentially harmful and even fatal electric shocks. 
 
2 While part of the literature on moral cleansing focuses on symbolic physical manifestations 
such as washing one’s hands with soap or using a cleaning wipe after recalling a misbehavior 
(e.g., Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006), I focus on behavioral cleansing in a broader sense as I 
include any form on compensation for pasts immoral behaviors.  
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As a reaction, several participants verbally expressed their discomfort and even lied to the 
experimenter to avoid hurting others. However, if a misbehavior is inconspicuous then 
individuals simply cannot react, due to the lack of stimuli. This second case is what the 
framework of bounded ethicality qualifies as a blind spot (Chugh et al., 2005), or numbness 
(Bazerman & Sezer, 2016), and resembles the automatic decision-making process described 
by Gioia (1992) in the Ford Pinto example. I therefore argue that one’s moral identity serves 
as a reference point. If an individual believes they are highly moral and misbehaves, the 
discrepancy between their identity beliefs and actual behavior will be large and therefore 
salient. This salient difference between beliefs and reality can be thought of as a moral “burn” 
and will stimulate the need for cleansing behaviors. On the contrary, if the misbehavior is 
inconspicuous, then this behavior may be taken as a signal of one’s identity (Akerlof & 
Kranton, 2000, 2005; Ariely & Norton, 2008; Bem, 1972). Consequently, it will serve as a new 
reference point and the moral identity of the individual will be shifted. In turn, this shift of 
reference point will increase the likelihood of repeating the past behavior, although the latter 
will no longer be considered as such due to the identity being adapted. My psychological 
mechanism can be described through the metaphor of a frog entering a cooking pot full of 
water. If the water is already boiling, the frog will react and try to escape. However, if the 
temperature of the water is slowly increasing, then the frog will not realize the danger before 
it is too late.  Consequently, I hypothesize that salient moral dissonance has a positive impact 
on the likelihood of future moral behaviors. This behavioral pattern – a misbehavior triggering 
a better behavior – is a behavioral expression of moral cleansing.  
Hypothesis 1: A salient moral dissonance is more likely to lead to a subsequent moral behavior 
than an inconspicuous moral dissonance. 
Conversely, I hypothesize that a moral dissonance that is inconspicuous has a negative 
impact on the likelihood of future moral behaviors.  
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Hypothesis 2: An inconspicuous moral dissonance is more likely to lead to a subsequent 
misbehavior than a salient moral dissonance. 
In a nutshell, individuals display different behavioral patterns depending on whether their 
moral dissonance is salient or not (see Figure 1). 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Furthermore, at the core of bounded ethicality resides the beliefs about one’s moral 
identity (Banaji et al., 2003; Chugh et al., 2005; Messick & Bazerman, 1996; Zhang et al., 
2015). For instance, Chugh et al. (2005) argued that individuals who believe they are more 
moral than they actually are may be blinded by these beliefs, and are consequently more likely 
to misbehave when tempted. In the same vein, past research has made the argument that 
individuals overestimate their morality, compared with others’ (Banaji et al., 2003; Tenbrunsel, 
1998). However, as I discriminate between salient and inconspicuous misbehaviors, I need to 
distinguish between the beliefs about moral identity and the beliefs about sensitivity to 
temptations. An individual who overestimates their moral identity is more likely to face salient 
misbehaviors, as their reference point is high. Likewise, underestimating one’s sensitivity to 
temptation leads to salient misbehaviors, as one’s reaction to temptations is unexpectedly high. 
Despite identity and sensitivity beliefs being central to the framework of bounded ethicality, 
there have been very little empirical investigations of the difference between the two. I 
therefore propose to compare these two types of beliefs about oneself to i) the same beliefs 
about others, and ii) the actual behaviors. As past research suggests, I hypothesize that 
individuals overestimate their moral identity and underestimate their sensitivity, compared to 
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both others’ identity and sensitivity, and compared to their actual moral behavior and 
sensitivity.  
Hypothesis 3a: Individuals overestimate their moral identity compared to both their perception 
of others’ moral identity and their own actual behavior. 
Hypothesis 3b: Individuals underestimate their sensitivity to temptation compared to both their 
perception of others’ sensitivity to temptation and their own actual sensitivity. 
To summarize, misbehaviors can lead to either moral cleansing or subsequent 
misbehaviors. I propose that the saliency of the prior misbehavior is what drives the two 
opposing behavioral patterns. Moreover, I posit that individuals believe they are generally more 
moral than others: they overestimate their moral identity and underestimate their sensitivity to 
temptations. 
EXPERIMENTAL SETTING 
I conducted an online experiment in order to test my hypotheses. In a first step, I 
collected the behavioral data for Hypotheses 1 and 2, using the effort task described by Abeler, 
Falk, Goette, and Huffman (2011). Participants were paid a fixed wage of 6 USD, for an 
average completion time of 50 minutes (7.12 USD per hour). One week later, I collected 
additional data through a questionnaire in order to control for demographics, as well as altruism 
and time preferences. The latter were measured using two items from the preference survey 
modules (Falk, Becker, Dohmen, Huffman, & Sunde, 2016). Participants who answered the 
follow-up questionnaire received 0.5 USD and took on average 1.85 minutes to complete it 
(16.2 USD per hour). Finally, I replicated the experiment in a hypothetical setting, asking a 
new pool of participants what they believe others chose, and what they believe they would have 
done. This last step allows us to test Hypotheses 3a and 3b regarding the importance of beliefs 
about the moral self and sensitivity to temptations. In this hypothetical setting, participants 
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were paid 0.5 USD for participating, and could earn an additional bonus based on their answers. 
On average, participants took 6.2 minutes to answer the questionnaire and were paid 0.62 USD 
(6 USD per hour). 
Sample and design. I collected data from 615 participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk, in 
three batches in consecutive days, only allowing US citizens with prior experience on MTurk 
and an approval rate of at least 90% to participate in order to maintain the relevance of the 
charity. I ran three experimental conditions, two of which have 200 participants, while the third 
one has 215. A total of 925 workers started the experiment, but only 615 completed it. Among 
the 310 workers who dropped out, only 16 dropped out after being exposed to a treatment. 
Moreover, these dropouts were not concentrated on a particular treatment: 5 were in the first 
treatment, 7 were in the second treatment, and 4 were in the third treatment. These data indicate 
that there was no treatment-specific attrition in the experiment. In terms of demographics, I 
have a predominantly male sample (59.76%), with age ranging between 18 and 70 years old 
(median between 31 and 35 years old). The sample is predominantly white (76.68%), with a 
median level of education equal or equivalent to a bachelor’s degree (52.64%). 
Procedure. The experiment was programmed using oTree (Chen, Schonger, & Wickens, 
2016), allowing to display experiments on web browsers and therefore facilitating data 
collection on online platforms such as MTurk. The experimental design consisted of three parts 
intended to capture each stage of the moral updating. In each part, I asked participants to count 
how many ones are present in a table randomly filled with ones and zeroes. As argued by 
Abeler et al. (2011), participants do not need any prior knowledge to complete this effort task. 
Moreover, the performance is easy to measure and incurs an effort cost on the participants due 
to the repetitive nature of the task. Participants had to choose between two options: a small and 
a large table (see Figure 1). In order to prevent learning effects from impacting the experiment, 
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participants counted four small and four large tables in a training phase, helping them 
familiarize with the task. 
Past the training phase, counting the ones in the large table donates 10 cents to a charity, 
while counting the ones in the small table removes 1 cent from the overall donation. I 
purposefully chose a relevant charity given the context of the study: Americares. At the time 
of data collection, Americares had issued a call for donations to help the direct and indirect 
victims of the COVID-19 pandemic. Participants were informed that, should they finish the 
experiment with a negative amount for the donation, this amount would be subtracted from the 
donations of other workers. One part containing 10 tables, participants made a total of 30 
decisions with consequences ranging from an increase in the overall donation of 3 USD and a 
decrease of 30 cents. The tables in each of the three rounds are in fact the same, displayed in a 
random order to maintain the difficulty constant across rounds. 
In the first and third parts, all participants were exposed to the same tables: small tables 
contain 6 lines and large tables contain 9 lines. Having the same parameters in the first and last 
parts allowed us to measure the impact of exposures to moral deviations. In the second part, I 
introduced the treatments by manipulating the number of lines in the small tables while keeping 
the consequences for the donation constant. The purpose was to reduce the efforts necessary to 
complete the small table to varying degrees, and consequently attract participants to reduce the 
donation to the charity. Participants were informed about the summary of their decisions and 
the consequences for the charity for the part they just finished, to prevent them from seeing the 
consequences of their decisions before a given part is over. A summary of the overall payoffs 
was displayed at the very end of the experiment. 
Finally, participants had the possibility to make a donation out of their wage at the end 
of the experiment. As my experimental task is rather demanding, I allowed for ex-post 
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donations to control for participants who would prefer to finish the experiment as fast as 
possible and compensate with a donation at the end. This final donation allows to distinguish 
between participants who want to maximize their hourly wage at the expense of the charity 
from participants who want to minimize their effort but still care about the charity. While both 
would only choose low effort, the latter would make a donation at the very end of the 
experiment. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Treatments. At the beginning of the second part, participants were randomly assigned to one 
of my three conditions: control, low temptation, and high temptation. The two treatments 
manipulating temptation aim at tempting participants to choose the small table more often than 
they did in the first part of the experiment, in order to trigger moral deviations of different 
magnitudes. Manipulating the magnitude of the moral deviations through temptation serves 
two purposes. First, it is an operationalization of the saliency of moral deviations. Deviating in 
favor of a table that is similar to the usual one is less salient than deviating in favor of a table 
that is much shorter. The difference between the size of the tables chosen in the first part and 
the size of the tables chosen in the second part is therefore used as a proxy for saliency. Second, 
tempting participants instead of imposing a shorter table maintains their free will, and prevents 
them from disengaging from the consequences of their decisions (e.g., Bandura, 1990, 1999, 
2002). 
In the control condition, the respective sizes of the small and large tables remained the same 
as in the first and third rounds. It therefore serves as a baseline and captures any potential time 




Insert Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------------ 
In the low temptation treatment, the number of lines in the small table was reduced from 6 to 
5. While small, this change still reduces the effort needed to count the small table and renders 
it slightly more attractive (see Figure 4).  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
------------------------------------ 
In the high temptation treatment, the number of lines in the small tables was further reduced to 
3. This condition significantly reduces the time needed to count the small table, increasing its 
attractivity (see Figure 5).   
----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Measures. I operationalized moral behaviors as the proportion of large tables counted in each 
of the three parts of the experiment. In a demographic questionnaire, I elicited measures for 
altruism and time preferences by using two items described in Falk et al. (2016). Altruism is 
measured by telling participants to imagine they just won $1000 and asking how much of this 
amount they would donate to a charity. Time preferences are measured by asking participants 
whether they prefer a certain amount now or a higher amount in 12 months. The question is 
repeated 5 times with varying amounts in order to refine the participant’s preference. While 
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hypothetical, both the measures have been found to be correlated with behavioral measures 
with a “high explanatory power” (Falk et al., 2016:16). Moreover, I controlled for household 
income, employment, and age category. 
RESULTS 
Aggregated results. In order to evaluate potential cleansing effects, I compare the differences 
in terms of decisions made by the participants across conditions. In other words, I am interested 
in knowing whether participants in the treatments chose different mixes of tables than the ones 
in the control group i) from the first to the second part, and ii) from the second to the third part. 
Overall, I therefore expect similar choices in the first part, decreases of different magnitudes 
in the second part for the low and high temptations treatments, and an increase in the third part 
only for the high temptation treatment (indicating moral cleansing). 
Figure 6 provides an overview of participants choices in all three parts of our three treatments. 
The overall pattern of the data looks as expected. In part 1 where there is not yet a difference 
between treatments, the proportion of high effort is very similar in all three conditions. 
Thereafter the two temptation treatments show the expected patterns. In the low temptation 
condition, I observe an intermediate drop in the proportion of high effort when the participants 
face a slightly stronger incentive to provide low effort in part 2. This effect is not reversed in 
part 3 when incentives return to the initial level. In the high temptation condition where the 
incentive to provide low effort is stronger in part 2, I see a more pronounced drop in the 
provision of high effort. This effect is partially undone in part 3 when incentives are set back 
to their initial level. In the control condition there is only a small decrease in effort provision 
in part 2 and thereafter the effort level remains roughly constant. 
----------------------------------- 




I test the statistical significance of these observed patterns with a regression analysis 
reported in Table 1. I estimated a full model with the immediate and delayed impacts of the 
two treatments, that is, the interaction between the treatments and the different parts of the 
experiment (immediate: Low*Part2 and High*Part2; delayed: Low*Part3 and High*Part3). 
Moreover, I controlled for the single effects of the parts (Part2 and Part3), being allocated to a 
treatment (Low and High), as well as several demographics (Sex and Age) and control variables 
(Altruism and Patience). 
 
The regression confirms that randomization worked so that there is no statistically significant 
difference in the baseline proportion of high effort provided in part 1 across conditions (control: 
0.39, low temptation: 0.37, high temptation: 0.39).3 The small decrease in the second part of 
the control condition (the proportion of high effort is 0.35) is not statistically significant (p = 
0.274). In the low temptation condition, in contrast, the proportion of high efforts in the low 
temptation treatment significantly decreased from part 1 (0.37) to part 2 (0.30, p = 0.038), yet, 
as expected, there were no significant changes from part 2 to part 3 (0.29, (p = 0.863). This 
pattern is in line with Hypothesis 2 that an inconspicuous moral dissonance is likely to lead to 
persistent subsequent misbehavior. In the high temptation condition, I observe a large and 
significant decrease in the proportion of high effort from part 1 (0.39) to part 2 (0.23, p = 
0.000). However, different than in the low temptation condition, the proportion of high effort 
recovers at least partially in part 3. There is a significant increase from part 2 (0.23) to part 3 
 
3 Control condition vs. the low temptation treatment (p = 0.657), control condition vs. high 
temptation treatment (p = 0.967), and low vs. high temptations treatments (p = 0.686). 
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(0.33, p = 0.008). This pattern provides support for Hypothesis one which predicts that a salient 
moral dissonance is likely to lead to moral cleansing. 
However, although the within treatment analysis reported so far is supportive of Hypotheses 1 
and 2, a clean test of my predictions requires a comparison of the between part differences 
across conditions. Such a diff-in-diff analysis established whether the patterns observed in the 
temptation treatments are statistically distinguishable from the time trend observed in the 
control condition. 
The analysis reveals that participants in the low temptation treatment did not reduce their 
efforts from part 1 to part 2 significantly more than participants in the control condition 
(p=0.283). This finding indicates that the magnitude of the additional misbehavior triggered 
by the low temptation was too small to be statistically distinguishable from the pure time trend 
in the control condition. Regarding the change between parts 2 and 3 the analysis confirms that 
participants in the low temptation treatment did not change their choices of efforts significantly 
more than participants in the control condition between part 2 and part 3 (p=0.941). Finally, 
the choices of efforts in the low temptation treatment for part 2 and part 3 combined were also 
not significantly lower than the ones in the control condition (p=0.119). The low temptation 
treatment did not, overall, significantly increase the proportion of misbehaviors.  
Participants in the high temptation treatment, in contrast, reduced their efforts significantly 
more than participants in the low temptation treatment (p=0.004) and participants in the control 
condition (p=0.000). Moreover, participants in the high temptation treatment also increased 
their efforts from part 2 to part 3 by 0.09 (to 0.33), which is significantly more than participants 
in the low temptation treatment (p=0.000) and participants in the control condition (p=0.000). 
This final proportion in the high temptation condition is not significantly different from the 
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ones in the control condition (0.34, p = 0.770) nor the low temptation treatment (0.29, p = 
0.400). 
To summarize, individuals who were exposed to a large temptation displayed a morally 
inconsistent behavioral pattern, by misbehaving in the second part but not in the third part. This 
behavioral pattern is consistent with moral cleansing, thus confirming hypothesis 1. Moreover, 
this behavioral pattern remains after introducing controls for sex, age, patience and altruism 
(see Table 1). While the behavioral pattern of individuals in the low temptation treatment is 
consistent with Hypothesis 2, the evidence in support of the hypothesis is weak, because the 
low temptation treatment did not yield results that were significantly different from the control 
condition. This lack of significant differences across treatments may indicate that the size 
effects are relatively low, or that there is heterogeneity in the individual reactions to the 
manipulations. An F test for individual fixed effects indicated that individuals vary greatly in 
terms of their initial effort provision as well as their reactions to the treatments (p < 0.001). 
Therefore, I conducted further analyses to identify types in order to identify different reactions 
to the magnitudes of temptation. This analysis allows to refine the investigation of the 
heterogeneity of moral identities.  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Type identification. As the aggregated results may hide different behavioral pattern, and there 
is evidence for heterogeneity of reactions to moral deviations, I apply a finite mixture 
regression in order to identify different types of individuals within the sample, using the method 
described in Bruhin, Fehr-Duda, and Epper (2010). Finite mixture models (FMM) are typically 
used to investigate latent heterogeneity, that is, they assume that an unobserved variable affects 
18 
 
individual reactions in a systematic way. FMM essentially assign individuals to different 
classes based on this unobserved individual characteristic and allows to measure the respective 
effects of our treatments depending on the different types of individuals (e.g., see Bruhin et al., 
2015). However, in order to identify types an FMM requires assumptions regarding i) the 
number of types in the sample, ii) the variables that are type-specific and iii) the variables that 
are constant across types. While it is possible to try different numbers of types and compare 
the resulting models, it is necessary to specify ex-ante which variables from Table 1 will vary 
across types, while the other variables remain common.  
I henceforth assume that individuals may differ in terms of initial moral behavior, 
reactions to temptation, and compensation after being tempted. I expect individual 
heterogeneity in terms of reactions to the treatments for two reasons. First, individuals who do 
not provide any – or very little – high effort in the first part of the experiment cannot be pushed 
to provide less, due to the experimental design. Second, in line with Tetlock et al. (2000) I 
expect individuals with a very high base morality to have a higher awareness of their moral 
deviations and therefore to be less prone to misbehaviors. On the contrary, I assume that the 
effects of being randomly attributed to one condition or another in the first part and being in 
the second or third parts are constant across types. 
In order to select a model, I looked at four criteria: the Akaike information criterion 
(AIC), the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), the normalized entropy criterion (NEC), and 
the integrated completed likelihood criterion (ICL). While AIC and BIC are measures of 
goodness of fit (although not without shortcomings, see Biernacki, Celeux, & Govaert, 2000; 
Celeux & Soromenho, 1996), NEC and ICL are indicators of how well the FMM can 
distinguish between types. I therefore ran finite mixture models with the number of types (K) 
ranging from two to five and compared them based on the four indicators. Without surprise, 
both measures of fit improve as the number of types increases (see Table 2). Likewise, the 
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identification criteria improve with the number of types, with the ICL decreasing and the NEC 
equal to zero, indicating a high quality of classification (Biernacki, Celeux, & Govaert, 1999). 
For this reason, I decided to discard the model with only one or two types. Moreover, the FMM 
attributed individuals to types with a posterior probability that is either close to zero or one for 
both K = 3 and K = 4, while for K = 5 some individuals remain between two types (see Figure 
7). Although the model with K = 4 yields a better fit, it may not add much to the analysis to 
distinguish between four types of individuals compared to three. In fact, a model with three 
types allows to distinguish between low, moderate, and high initial moral behaviors, while a 
model with four types would constrain one of the three categories to be separated in two. This 
can also lead to a higher number of misattributions to types for the model with K = 4 than K = 
3, as shown in Figure 7. Consequently, I retained the FMM with three types for the final 
analysis of type-based reactions. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 7 about here 
------------------------------------ 
In the selected FMM with K=3, Type 1 individuals constitute 57.3% of the sample, Type 2 
individuals amount to 22.9% of the sample, and Type 3 individuals represent 19.7% of the 
sample (Table 3). 
----------------------------------- 





Insert Figure 8 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
The different behavioral patterns per condition identified by the finite mixture model 
are summarized in Figure 8. The differences between types, both in term of base effort 
provision and in terms reactions to the experimental treatments are summarized in Table 4.  
Type 1. Type 1 individuals display a low initial moral identity, as they rarely provide high 
efforts. They are therefore expected not to react to temptations as they already are close to the 
lowest morality allowed by the experimental design. Overall, they are not expected to show 
any increase or decrease throughout the experimental parts. Type 1 individuals provided an 
average initial proportion of high effort equal to 0.0548 across conditions. Although Type 1 
participants in the low temptation treatment reduced their efforts significantly more than 
participants in the control condition (p=0.022), the effect sizes are very small. For instance, 
participants in the control condition reduced their efforts by 0.04 from part 1 to part 2. 
Likewise, Type 1 participants in the high temptation treatment did not decrease their efforts 
significantly more than participants in the low temptation treatment (p=0.437) and participants 
in the control condition (p=0.135). Moreover, Type 1 participants in the low temptation 
treatment did not increase their efforts from part 2 to part 3 significantly more than participants 
in the control condition (p=0.591). Although Type 1 participants in the high temptation 
treatment increased their efforts significantly more in the last part than participants in the low 
temptation treatment (p=0.016) and participants in the control condition (p=0.028), the 
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increase is only of 0.04 and therefore small. In conclusion, Type 1 participants initially display 
extremely low efforts, which essentially leaves no room for relevant reactions to the treatments. 
Type 2. Type 2 individuals initially provide almost only high efforts, displaying a really high 
moral identity. These individuals are therefore expected to be sensitive to temptation only if 
the temptation is quite strong. I expect Type 2 individuals to be prone to moral cleansing 
behaviors, because they will mostly experience salient moral dissonances. Type 2 individuals 
provided an initial proportion of high efforts of 0.95, averaged across conditions. Type 2 
participants in the low temptation treatment did not reduce their efforts from part 1 to part 2 
significantly more than participants in the control condition (p=0.847). However, Type 2 
participants reduced their efforts significantly more than both participants in the low temptation 
treatment (p=0.002) and participants in the control condition (p=0.001). Moreover, although 
there were no significantly different changes of choices of efforts from part 2 to part 3 between 
Type 2 participants in the low temptation treatment and participants in the control group 
(p=0.755), participants in the high temptation treatment increased their proportion of high 
efforts by 0.20. This increase is significantly higher than the changes observed in the low 
temptation treatment (p=0.001) and in the control condition (p=0.001). However, this final 
proportion in the high temptation treatment was not significantly different from the ones in the 
control treatment (p = 0.188) nor the low temptation treatment (p = 0.798). As for type 1, type 
2 individuals were not affected by the low temptation treatment and thus only provide support 
for Hypothesis 1.  
Type 3. Type 3 individuals display a mixed moral identity. They are expected to react to 
temptation more than Type 2 individuals as they do not have a strong initial moral identity. 
Type 3 individuals are therefore expected to drive the results described in Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
In addition, they fail to cleanse in the low temptation treatment, despite their misbehaviors. 
Type 3 individuals provided an initial proportion of high efforts amounting to 0.69 across 
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conditions. Contrary to the previous two types, Type 3 participants in the low temptation 
treatment decreased their efforts significantly more than participants in the control condition 
(p=0.006) from part 1 to part 2. Similarly, Type 3 participants in the high temptation treatment 
also decreased their efforts significantly more than participants in the control condition 
(p=0.000). However, the decrease of 0.14 observed in the low temptation treatment was not 
significantly different from the decrease of 0.55 in the high temptation treatment (p=0.197).  
Despite the lack of significant difference between the two treatment effects, two different 
reactions were observed between part 2 and part 3. While Type 3 participants in the low 
temptation treatment did not change their proportion of high efforts significantly differently 
than participants in the control condition (p=0.783), participants in the high temptation 
treatment increased their proportion of high efforts by 0.12. This increase is significantly higher 
than the changes observed for participants in the low temptation treatment (p=0.047) and 
participants in the control condition (p=0.021). However, the final proportion of high efforts 
in the high temptation treatment, summing to 0.26, is significantly smaller than the one in the 
control condition (p = 0.005), yet not significantly different from the one in the low temptation 
treatment (p = 0.650). In consequences, I find support for both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 
within type 3 individuals. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------ 
To summarize, I found support for Hypothesis 1 in Type 2 and Type 3 individuals, as both 
showed behavioral patterns that are in line with moral cleansing. Moreover, Hypothesis 2 is 
supported for Type 3 individuals, as they failed to cleanse after a smaller decrease of morality. 
I can therefore conclude that moral cleansing seems to be at least partially triggered by the 
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magnitude of a prior moral deviation, but also that moral deviations depend on the initial 
morality of individuals. However, as the majority of the sample is composed of Type 1 
individuals whose initial morality is low, the average effects are weakened when looking at the 
aggregated results. The FMM therefore allowed to capture heterogeneity of i) initial levels of 
efforts, and ii) treatment reactions. 
Distortion of beliefs. Part of the literature on moral behaviors suggests that one 
explanation for misbehaving relies in distorted beliefs about one’s morality (Chugh & 
Bazerman, 2007; Chugh, Bazerman, & Banaji, 2005). More specifically, distorted beliefs may 
prevent individuals from seeing their own moral transgressions, which in turn prohibits 
cleansing mechanisms from being triggered. To investigate the accuracy of individual beliefs, 
I replicated the experiment in a hypothetical setting (n=402) on MTurk. Participants were 
randomly allocated to one of the three conditions of the initial study, before being presented 
the same instructions as the initial study. However, they were asked to predict how many small 
tables the participants in the initial study had chosen. Each part of the initial experiment was 
presented in the same order, to recreate similar conditions. For each part, participants were 
given 10 ranges to choose from and instructed them that choosing the right range would grant 
them a bonus of USD 0.5 per correct prediction (in addition to a fixed wage of USD 0.5). In a 
second step, participants were asked to indicate, for each of the three parts of the initial study, 
how many small tables they would have personally counted. While the first step is an 
incentivized task aimed at assessing their beliefs about other individuals’ behaviors, the second 
one only assesses their own intentions and is therefore not incentivized (besides the fixed wage 
their receive for the completion of the task). 
----------------------------------- 




I operationalized the beliefs about one’s moral identity by aggregating the hypothetical 
decisions across conditions for the first part of the experiment. The beliefs about others were 
operationalized in the same manner. Participants reported they would count 7.26 large tables 
out of 10, while they believe others would count 5.62 large tables. In line with past research 
(e.g., Banaji et al., 2003; Chugh et al., 2005; Tenbrunsel, 1998) and Hypothesis 3a, participants 
overestimated their moral identity compared with their beliefs about others (p = 0.0000). 
Moreover, the average number of large tables counted in the first part of the initial study (3.85) 
was significantly smaller than both the participants’ beliefs about themselves (p = 0.0000) and 
others (p = 0.0000). 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 10 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Sensitivity beliefs were operationalized by calculating the relative difference between the 
beliefs about the small tables counted in the first and the second parts of the study, that is, the 
estimated reactions to the treatments divided by the estimated behaviors in the first part. 
Participants in the control condition did not report any significant relative change between the 
first and the second parts of the study for themselves (p = 0.1322) nor others (p = 0.3141). 
While the two beliefs are not significantly different from one another (p = 0.9089), both the 
beliefs about themselves and the beliefs about others are significantly smaller than the actual 
relative change of behavior that occurred in the initial study (p = 0.0066 and p = 0.0054 
respectively). Similarly, participants in the low temptation condition reported no significant 
sensitivity for themselves (p = 0.5442), whereas they believe others are sensitive to low 
temptations (p = 0.0074). However, participants underestimated both their own sensitivity (p 
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= 0.0031) and the sensitivity of others (p = 0.0170) compared to the sensitivity from the initial 
study. Participants in the high temptation reported significant sensitivities for themselves (p = 
0.003) as well as others (p = 0.0011), although both are significantly underestimated compared 
to the actual behavioral reactions to the high temptation treatment (p = 0.0001 and p = 0.0002 
respectively). However, there were no significant differences between the sensitivities reported 
for themselves and others (p = 0.6874), contradicting Hypothesis 3b. Finally, participants 
reported no significant long-lasting effects of the treatments on the third part of the experiment, 
contradicting the behavioral data. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In this paper, I investigated the impact of moral deviations of different magnitudes on the 
likelihood of subsequent misbehaviors. The present experimental evidence supports my 
assumption that large moral deviations increase the likelihood of moral cleansing. However, 
my analysis of the individual heterogeneity shows that both the sensitivity to temptations and 
the extent to which individuals cleansed depended on their initial level of effort provision. My 
results are pioneer in that I explain different behavioral patterns through a concept previously 
overlooked: the magnitude of moral deviations. In line with my expectations, large moral 
deviations lead to lower likelihoods of subsequent misbehaviors, while small moral deviations 
increase the likelihoods thereof, at least in part of my sample. Theoretically, I explain this 
mechanism by arguing that large deviations are salient and trigger a reaction, while small 
deviations remain inconspicuous and may be taken as a signal from the moral self. Finally, my 
results support the framework of bounded ethicality, in that I found that individuals 
systematically overestimate their moral identity, both compared to their beliefs about others’ 
moral identity and compared to their own behavior. However, my analysis of the beliefs about 
sensitivity to temptations showed that individuals only underestimate their sensitivity 
compared to their actual behaviors, but do not believe they are less sensitive than others. 
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Theoretical and Practical Implications 
The present work makes several important contributions to the behavioral ethics 
literature. First, this paper advances research on moral behaviors by providing a behavioral 
measure of cleansing behaviors. While past research has often neglected the moral identity of 
individuals in their study of cleansing effects, I have focused on capturing every stages of 
misbehaviors: the past, present, and future. Moreover, my analysis of types shows that 
individuals’ reactions to temptations, that is whether they deviate from their identity under 
tempting pressures, depends on their identity itself. While very moral individuals resisted low 
temptations, individuals with a lower initial morality succumbed to them. Moreover, I have 
found that individuals with a high moral identity cleanse fully once the temptations are 
removed, so as to recover from temptation to regain their initial moral behavior. On the other 
hand, individuals who were less moral had a decreasing morality over time. These individuals 
consequently do not recover their initial moral behavior, but only cleanse partially. This is 
especially important when considering whether some individuals are more prone to corruption 
than others, as tempting situations are consequently more of a problem for individuals who do 
not have strong moral identities.  
Second, I depart from past literature by including a measure of morality prior to the 
introduction of my treatments. As I showed that (for some individuals) cleansing behaviors are 
triggered by large departure from one’s moral identity, it is crucial to capture this initial level 
of morality, which serves as a baseline. This baseline can then be compared to i) the behavior 
once a treatment is introduced, and ii) the final behavior after the treatment is removed.  
Third, I investigated individual beliefs not only about moral identity (i.e., behavior), 
but also about sensitivity to temptation (i.e., reaction to the treatments). While the literature 
often assumes that individuals overestimate their moral identity and underestimate their 
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sensitivity to temptation, both compared to other and to reality, I found that this is only partially 
true for the beliefs about one’s sensitivity to temptation. Although individuals did 
underestimate their sensitivity compared to the actual behaviors, they did not believe being less 
sensitive than others. These results emphasize the importance to distinguish between beliefs 
about moral identities and beliefs about sensitivities to temptations and calls for further 
exploration of the latter.  
Limitations and future directions 
My research is not without shortcomings. While I find general support for Hypothesis 
1 and partial support for Hypothesis 2, only 42.6% of my sample are affected. Indeed, the 
majority of the sample chose to provide low efforts and show little concern for the charity. I 
speculate this may be due to the pool of participants, as workers on Amazon Mechanical Turk 
primarily aim at maximizing their hourly wage4. Nevertheless, my study is rather conservative 
in that I tried to capture morality phenomena in a context that is not favorable to moral 
behaviors.  
While I focused on the effect of moral deviations on subsequent misbehaviors, I did not 
include moral licensing. Although I acknowledge its importance in understanding the 
mechanisms behind cleansing and licensing behaviors, I focused on reactions to misbehaviors. 
 
4 Several participants mentioned this in the comment they left at the end of the experiment. Here is a selection of 
these comments: 
“I need to protect any money I earn at this point, I am poor” 
“MTurk used to offset my income, but since COVID-19, it has temporarily become my only income since I'm 
still awaiting unemployment benefits to kick in.” 
“i decided not to donate because i need the funds” 
Likewise, several participants doubted the veracity of the impact on the charity: 
“I am never sure in studies like these whether donations are real. I prefer to make mine knowing what's actually 
happening.” 
“I just wanted to finish the task quickly. I don't think you're actually going to decrease your donation (if you're 
going to make one at all). This was a psychological experiment to see if people would help or hurt a donation. 
(This is my guess.)” 
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However, I hope to see more research including continuous behavioral measures also in the 
investigation of moral licensing. However, I expect licensing effects to be of smaller 
magnitudes, as individuals tend to display stronger reactions to events with negative valences, 
such as misbehaviors, than positive ones (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
Finally, my investigation of individual reactions to misbehaviors could open the door 
to different types of interventions aiming at reducing misbehaviors. Such interventions could, 
for example, focus on improving the moral identity of individuals, so as to reduce their 
sensitivity to low temptations and trigger full cleansing after being exposed to high temptations. 
Moreover, I hope to see future research investigating how the awareness of temptations could 
help reduce the sensitivity to these temptations.  
Conclusion 
This work offers a promising beginning for the study of moral behaviors. My results 
demonstrate how the likelihood of subsequent misbehaviors is affected by the magnitude of 
prior misbehaviors, providing evidence for the framework of bounded ethicality. While small 
misbehaviors increase the likelihood of subsequent misbehaviors for individuals with moderate 
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FIGURE 1. Theoretical Model for the Link between Prior and Subsequent Misbehaviors, 
Moderated by the Saliency of the Moral Dissonance 
 
FIGURE 2. Choice between the small and large tables as displayed on the participants' screen 
in the first and third parts. 
 
FIGURE 3. Choice between the small and large tables as displayed on the participants' screen 




FIGURE 4. Choice between the small and large tables as displayed on the participants' screen 
in the second part (low temptation condition). 
 
 
FIGURE 5. Choice between the small and large tables as displayed on the participants' screen 




FIGURE 6. Choices of high efforts per condition 
 
Notes: Average proportion of high effort (large tables) counted by the participants across parts, per treatment. The error bars 
represent plus/minus one standard deviation. 
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FIGURE 7. Distributions of the posterior probabilities of belonging to types, based on the 








Notes: Average proportion of high effort (large tables) counted by the participants across parts, per treatment, for each of 
the three identified types of individuals. The error bars represent plus/minus one standard deviation. 
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FIGURE 9. Comparison between actual choices of efforts and beliefs about self and others
 
Notes: On the left, the bars represent the average proportions of high effort (large tables) that participants reported they 
would count across parts, per treatment. In the middle, the bars represent the average proportions of high effort that 
participants reported others would count across parts, per treatment. On the right, the bars represent the average 
proportions of high efforts that participants actually counted in the behavioral experiment, across parts, per treatment. For 
all, the error bars represent plus/minus one standard deviation. 
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FIGURE 10. Comparison between actual treatment effects (immediate and delayed) on efforts 
and beliefs about self and others  
 
Notes: On the left, the bars represent the average changes in the proportions of high effort provided (large tables counted) 
that participants reported they would count. In the middle, the bars represent the average proportions of high effort that 
participants reported others would count across parts, per treatment. On the right, the bars represent the average 
proportions of high efforts that participants actually counted in the behavioral experiment, across parts, per treatment. For 
all, the changes from part 1 to part 2 represent the treatment effect, that is, the reaction to temptations. The changes from 
part 1 to part 3 represent the potential long-lasting effects of the treatments. The error bars represent plus/minus one 
standard deviation. 
Appendix B 
TABLE 1. Mean immediate and delayed treatment effects of the choices of high efforts 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
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Constant 0.392 *** 0.283 *** 0.222 *** 0.227 *** 
 (0.010)   (0.026)   (0.027)   (0.027)   
Low  -0.019   -0.010   -0.019   -0.019   
 (0.015)   (0.018)   (0.018)   (0.018)   
High  -0.002   0.006   -0.0003   -0.001   
 (0.015)   (0.018)   (0.017)   (0.017)   
Part2  -0.046 **  -0.048 **  -0.048 **  -0.048 **  
 (0.015)   (0.017)   (0.017)   (0.017)   
Low*Part2 -0.029   -0.028   -0.028   -0.028   
 (0.021)   (0.025)   (0.025)   (0.025)   
High*Part2 -0.114 *** -0.109 *** -0.109 *** -0.109 *** 
 (0.021)   (0.025)   (0.025)   (0.025)   
Part3 -0.054 *** -0.041 *  -0.041 *  -0.041 *  
 (0.015)   (0.017)   (0.017)   (0.017)   
Low*Part3 -0.027   -0.027   -0.027   -0.027   
 (0.021)   (0.025)   (0.025)   (0.025)   
High*Part3 -0.010   0.0003   0.0003   0.0003   
 (0.021)   (0.025)   (0.025)   (0.025)   
Sex               -0.08 *** -0.0784 *** -0.077 *** 
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               (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.009)   
Age               0.026 *** 0.029 *** 0.029 *** 
               (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)   
Altruism                             0.0003 *** 0.0003 *** 
                             (0.00002)   (0.00002)   
Patience                                           -0.001   
                                           (0.0004)   
N 18450              12450              12450              12450              
R2 0.011   0.033   0.047   0.047   
 *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. 
 
TABLE 2. Model selection criteria 
 
K = 1 K = 2 K = 3 K = 4 K = 5 
AIC 24348.61 10202.35 6744.55 5069.95 3832.57 
BIC 24426.83 10327.52 6916.65 5288.99 4098.54 
NEC 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ICL 24426.83 10330.58 6928.84 5311.08 4175.65 
 
TABLE 3. Proportions of Type 1 (low morality), Type 2 (high morality), and Type 3 (moderate 
morality) identified in the sample by the Finite Mixture Model 
 
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
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Proportion 0.573 0.229 0.197 
SE (0.020) (0.017) (0.016) 
 
TABLE 4. Mean immediate and delayed treatment effects of the choices of high efforts for the 
three types identified by the Finite Mixture Model. 
 
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
Type-specific    
Constant 0.071***  0.988*** 0.615***  
 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.026) 
Low*Part2 0.012 0.04 -0.242*** 
 
(0.02) (0.025) (0.068) 
High*Part2 0.011 -0.157** -0.408*** 
 
(0.02) (0.057) (0.056) 
Low*Part3 -0.024  0.034 -0.267*** 
 
(0.025) (0.033) (0.068) 
High*Part3 0.062* 0.048†  -0.284*** 
 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.067) 
    
Common coefficients 



















 *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.1 
Appendix C 
Additional resource: Distributions of the posterior probabilities of belonging to types, based on 
the results of the Finite Mixture Models for two types of individuals 
 
 
Organizational Changes as Micro-level Processes: Old Phenomena, New Typology 
Abstract 
Organizational changes are typically categorized as either divergent or convergent. While 
divergent changes are characterized by an organizational reorientation, convergent changes 
build on the existing organizational form. Yet, several scholars have reported opposing 
dynamics for the same type of change, leading to a certain confusion regarding the current 
typology of organizational changes. In this paper, I suggest that the distinction between 
divergent and convergent changes is therefore not sufficient to categorize organizational 
changes. Building on the emerging literature on microfoundations, I describe organizational 
changes through the learning strategies of change recipients: the organizational members. 
Eventually, I draw from the interplay between an organization and its members to propose a 
different typology of organizational changes. This new typology can then serve future to 
identify patterns of changes, with distinct dynamics.  
 
Keywords: Organizational change, typology, learning strategies, dynamics 
 
Matthieu Légeret 





The first months of 2020 were heavily marked by the outbreak of the COVID-19 
pandemic. As the coronavirus spread through the world, so did a set of new sanitary measures, 
often imposed by governmental regulations. Likewise, the needs of society at large evolved 
with the pandemic. These sudden changes in the environment of organizations not only had an 
impact on organizational processes, but also on organizational members. For instance, many 
organizations eventually resorted to remote work, and many employees discovered the benefits 
and costs of working from home. Inevitably, throughout its life, an organization will face 
changes that are significant enough to challenge its very core (Nadler & Tushman, 1989). These 
radical changes can be rapid and discontinuous (Romanelli & Tushman, 1994), or slow and 
incremental (Amis, Slack, & Hinings, 2004). Whether abrupt or incremental, successful radical 
changes not only impact organizations but also the individuals within the organizations, 
through a change of appropriateness of practices. For example, Greenwood, Suddaby, and 
Hinings (2002) focused on how radical change for accounting firms modified the role and 
practices of accountants within their firm. Traditionally, the literature distinguishes such radical 
or divergent changes, which are characterized by the reorientation of the organization (e.g., 
Greenwood & Hinings, 1996), from convergent changes. However, the denomination of 
“radical” or “divergent” (opposed to “convergent”) appears to be insufficient by itself, in that 
opposing dynamics have been observed for a single type of change. Moreover, although many 
scholars have focused on the perspective of individuals facing changes (e.g., Bartunek, 1984; 
Bartunek & Moch, 1987; Dunham, Grube, Gardner, Cummings, & Pierce, 1989; Lau & 
Woodman, 1995; Oreg, Bartunek, Lee, & Do, 2018), the interplay between change as an 
organizational phenomenon and the individual processes underlying it is often missing.  
In this paper, I challenge the current typology of organizational change, and propose to 
distinguish changes based on (i) the organizational environmentand on (ii) the decision 
strategies of the individuals within the organization. In particular, I consider how changes in 
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an organization’s environment can require organizational members to adapt their learning 
strategies, but also how different strategies can be a source of change. A better understanding 
of individual processes not only helps comprehend why different dynamics can arise at the 
organizational level, but also how to influence those dynamics by acting on the individual 
strategies. Because I emphasize the interplay between an organization and its members, my 
paper follows recent interests in multi-level approaches (e.g., Chandler & Hwang, 2015; Powell 
& Colyvas, 2008; Powell & Rerup, 2017). 
The main goal of this paper is to offer an alternative classification of organizational 
changes that yields consistent dynamics for a given type of change. Specifically, I distinguish 
between two types of changes – evolution and revolution – for which learning strategies are in 
adequacy with the organizational environment and two types changes – maladaptation and 
waste – for which the learning strategies are not aligned with the environment. In this respect, 
the present work makes three important contributions. First, a more precise typology of 
organizational change offers the opportunity to see new patterns emerge and can therefore 
strengthen the understanding of the macro-level phenomenon. Second, focusing on the 
microfoundations of organizational change—by integrating the underlying cognitive 
mechanisms of the organizational members in the face of change—provides a better 
understanding of the organizational phenomena itself (Schilke, 2018). Third, as I consider the 
interplay between the macro and the micro levels, I open the black box of individual processes 








Typology and Dynamics of Change 
Change can take on many forms. Accordingly, it has been defined as “an empirical 
observation of difference in form, quality, or state over time in an organizational strategy, a 
program, a product, or the overall organization” (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995: 512). Whether a 
change of practice (e.g., Greenwood et al., 2002; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Townley, 2002) or a 
change of interpretations (e.g., Bartunek & Moch, 1987; Isabella, 1990; Lau & Woodman, 
1995), change is a dynamic process that impacts the individuals within the organization in 
different ways and triggers different attitudes (e.g., see Lau & Woodman, 1995). 
Organizational changes are commonly separated in two categories: convergent and divergent 
changes (see Greenwood & Hinings, 2006, for an overview of the current state of the literature). 
Convergent changes are changes that ameliorate the current form of an organization. For 
example, a convergent change could be the implementation of practices that will increase the 
performance of individuals, while maintaining the previous goals and performance measures. 
Conversely, divergent changes are changes that alter the organizational form itself. Such 
radical changes are characterized by an organizational reorientation (Greenwood & Hinings, 
1996; Greenwood & Hinings, 2006; Greenwood et al., 2002; Nadler & Tushman, 1989; 
Romanelli & Tushman, 1994; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). Although most scholars agree on 
the distinction between convergent and divergent changes, different dynamics of change have 
been theorized and observed. On the one hand, Tushman and Romanelli (1985; see also Miller 
& Friesen, 1980, and Romanelli & Tushman, 1994) have argued that convergent changes take 
place incrementally over time to improve the current organizational form, while divergent 
changes are disruptive, rapid and discontinuous, and fundamentally alter the current state of an 
organization. On the other hand, Greenwood and Hinings (1996, 2006; see also Amis et al., 
2004; Greenwood et al., 2002) have argued that divergent changes can also happen in an 
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incremental manner and take a long time to be implemented. Although these two streams of 
research seem to oppose each other, they both provide evidence supporting their theoretical 
accounts on the dynamics of organizational change. Moreover, both sides agree on one key 
element: the importance of the perspective of the individuals facing changes. For instance, 
while Anderson and Tushman (1990; see also Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1996; Virany, Tushman, 
& Romanelli, 1992) emphasize the inability of current executives to undergo radical changes, 
Greenwood and Hinings (1996, 2006) argue that groups of individuals who are unsatisfied with 
the status quo may be favourable to changes.  
In my view, the current typology of organizational change, specifically, the distinction 
between convergent and divergent changes, is insufficient for two reasons. First, it focusses on 
consequences of the change itself, yet pays little attention to the source of the change. Second, 
and relatedly, it does not consider the underlying processes, that is, the perspective of 
organizational members. To address these shortcomings, I suggest grounding the typology of 
organizational change on characteristics of the organizations’ environment and the individual 
processes that take place within the organizations. Consequently, I build on the common 
ground between these two streams of research by switching the scope of analysis from the 
impact of change on the organization to the interaction between the learning strategies and the 
organizational environment. Several scholars have already emphasized the importance of 
studying the mechanisms or dynamics of change to better understand the change processes 
(Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002; Greenwood et al., 2002; Hatch, 1993; Isabella, 1990; 
Tsoukas, 1989; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). Some have focused on the perspective of the 
individuals facing organizational changes (Bartunek & Moch, 1987; Isabella, 1990; Lau & 
Woodman, 1995), while others have linked different levels to one another (Greenwood & 
Hinings, 1996), by considering the impact of groups on responses to change. Despite these 
efforts, approaches linking the micro-level processes, such as cognitive perspectives, to the 
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changes at the macro-level remain scarce. In line with this view, Powell and Rerup (2017) 
called for more research on the microfoundations of organizations, in an attempt to open the 
black box that is often used to represent individual processes. 
MICROFOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES 
Although the dynamics of change constitute a puzzle at the organizational level, it is 
often useful to look at how individual practices are impacted, that is, how organizational 
phenomena can affect the daily life of individuals within the organizations (e.g., Cardinale, 
2018; Harmon, Green Jr, & Goodnight, 2015; Tracey, 2016). This approach, often called 
microfoundations, aims at inhabiting the macro-level events with a cognitive perspective 
(Schilke, 2018) or, more generally, individual viewpoints (Powell & Rerup, 2017). Arguably, 
looking at the microfoundations of a phenomenon allows for multi-level explanations and may 
hence offer a more accurate picture of the bilateral dynamics that animate the relationship 
between an organization and its individuals (Chandler & Hwang, 2015; Powell & Colyvas, 
2008).  
Individual and Social Learning Strategies 
To be accurately described, individual processes need to be contextualized. In his 
description of bounded rationality, Simon (1997) emphasized the importance of both the 
natural cognitive limitations of individuals and the environments for which their processes have 
been built. Boundedly rational individuals are assumed to hold limited, yet realistic capacities, 
that allow them to rely on simplified decision-making processes such as heuristics (see 
Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Luan, 
Reb, and Gigerenzer, 2019). Heuristics are decision strategies that rely on a limited amount of 
information to make fast, yet efficient decisions (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). Close to 
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Simon’s work, a key aspect of heuristics is that they are adapted to their environment: they are 
ecologically rational (Todd, Gigerenzer, & the ABC Research Group, 2012).).  
Within organizations, some behaviors or processes are more appropriate than others, or 
more efficient. However, in many instances these behaviors do not emerge automatically, out 
of instinct, but instead have to be learnt. For example, a new organizational member may have 
to learn the rites and routines already in use in the organization, in order to fit their new 
environment. However, learning processes can take on different forms, typically described as 
individual and social learnings. Individual learning, or asocial learning, relies on trial-and-
error, and requires engaging in costly searches for information regarding one’s environment 
(Boyd & Richerson, 1985, 1995; Giraldeau, Valone, & Templeton, 2002; Rogers, 1988). Social 
learning, on the other hand, implies learning from other individuals, typically by copying their 
behaviors. Social learning therefore is less costly than individual learning and can be more 
adaptive (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Boyd & Richerson, 1985, 1988; Henrich & Boyd, 1998). 
Classic examples of social learning include imitation of random individuals (Boyd & 
Richerson, 1985; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981), imitation of successful individuals (Boyd 
& Richerson, 1985, 2002; Schlag, 1998, 1999; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Hertwig & 
Hoffrage, 2013), or a mix of different imitation strategies (Laland, 2004; McElreath et al., 
2008; Whiten, Horner, Litchfield, & Marshall-Pescini, 2004). Arguably, imitation strategies 
fall into the category of heuristics, such as imitate-the-successful, or imitate-the-majority (see 
Hertwig & Hoffrage, 2013), as they are more frugal in terms of searching costs than first-hand 
experiences1.  
The premise of this work is to consider organizational members as decision-makers. As 
such, individuals must be in adequacy with their environment in order to be more efficient: the 
 
1 However, it is worth noting that heuristics are not limited to routinized processes, as they 
can also be used for innovation (Kheirandish & Mousavi, 2018). 
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other organizational members, and, ultimately, the organization itself. Likewise, an 
organization must adapt to fit its environment. Coming back to the example of the pandemic, 
most—if not all—organizations were impacted such that they had to adapt to their new 
environment. For simplification purposes, I will adopt the perspective of the organizational 
members, and refer to both the organization and its environment as the members’ environment. 
Individuals hold a repertoire of practices that are deemed appropriate, or efficient, within their 
environment. Following the principle of ecological rationality, this set of practices should be 
adapted to their environment. Should the environment change, the organizational members may 
have to adapt, and in so doing, learn by resorting to individual or social learning strategies. A 
change in the environment, either at the organizational level or the institutional one, can change 
the set of practices deemed appropriate inside the organization. As a consequence, 
organizational learners may have to learn new routines or practices in order to remain efficient. 
However, the way they learn what new practices have a higher fit with the organization will 
impact the dynamics of the organizational change. For instance, if an organization were 
composed only of individual learners, then the process of changing practices by engaging in 
trial-and-error for each individual would be very costly, either in time or resource, and therefore 
inefficient. This interplay between learning strategies and their environment, the strategies and 
the appropriate practices, as well as these practices and change dynamics is summarized in 
Figure 1. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Learning strategies as a Response to Change 
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When a change in the environment affects the fitness of individuals’ practices, for 
example by reducing their efficiency or appropriateness, then the practices may need to be 
adapted or dropped entirely to be replaced by new ones. In both instances, organizational 
members need to learn, either individually to innovate, or socially by copying another 
organizational member. If an organization is composed of a high proportion of individual 
learners, then the processes of (i) finding more adapted practices and (ii) harmonization of 
practices will be slow and costly (Boyd & Richerson 1985; Henrich & Boyd 1998). In contrast, 
social learning is more efficient in terms of costs, provided that individuals hold reliable cues 
as to whom they should copy (Boyd & Richerson 1985; Schlag, 1998, 1999; Henrich & Gil-
White 2001). Moreover, if a change requires a higher cost of searching for alternatives, then 
social learning becomes more adaptive (Henrich & Gill-White, 2001). 
Learning Strategies as a Source of Change 
It is also possible for organizational practices to evolve over time without any relevant 
change taking place in the organization’s environment. For example, practices can improve 
through time due to experience. This process, often referred to as first-order change in the 
organizational change literature (Bartunek & Moch, 1987), aims at deepening a pre-existing 
practice. However, this perfection of practices can only occur under two conditions (Galef, 
1995; Laland, 2004). First, some of the organizational members must be individual learners, as 
they keep on exploring on their own and provide a source of innovation. Second, their practices 
need to be copied by social learners in order to propagate through the organization.  
The Ecological Rationality of Learning Strategies 
Just like practices and organizations fit their environment, the decision to learn 
individually or socially depends on what other organizational members decide to do. At the 
extreme, if an organization were entirely composed of social learners, then it would reach a 
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stable state where practices no longer evolve due to a lack of innovation (Laland, 2004). Indeed, 
there needs to be a balance between individual and social learners so that both strategies are 
adaptive (Barnard & Sibly, 1981; Rogers, 1988). Moreover, learning strategies must be adapted 
to the characteristics of the organization’s environment. If an organization’s environment is 
stable, then a low proportion of individual learners is sufficient to innovate before being copied 
to propagate the new practices through the organization. However, if the environment is 
constantly changing, then social learners are no longer adaptive, as they will always be late on 
the latest changes (McElreath, et al., 2008). 
 So far, I have advocated that two factors are important for the categorization of 
organizational changes: an organization’s environment characteristics and the learning 
strategies of its members. The types of organizational changes resulting from these factors are 
summarized in Table 1 and explained below2. 
Revolution. In stable environments, social learning is adaptive as it leads to lower costs 
(Boyd & Richerson, 2002; Henrich & Gill-White, 2001), as long as there is a source of 
innovation such as a small proportion of influential individual learners to copy (Galef, 1995; 
Laland, 2004). If there is a reliable source of innovation, then social learners can imitate the 
source and new practices can spread throughout the organization. 
Maladaptation. When an organization’s environment is prone to frequent changes, 
social learning is far less adaptive (McElreath et al., 2008). Because of the repeated changes, 
social learners are constantly late on more recent changes. At the extreme, if changes occur at 
every period, then social learners will always be late – and therefore less efficient than 
individual learners – as they rely on outdated information. 
 
2 Note that in order to compare the different cases, I operate under the assumption that 
learning strategies are exogenous and fixed.  
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Waste. In environments where changes are scarce, individual learning is costly (Boyd 
& Richerson, 1985; Henrich & Boyd, 1998; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). However, while 
individual learning is less adaptive in such environments, they are a necessary source of 
innovation for social learners to copy from (Galef, 1995; Laland, 2004). Individual learners 
therefore generate discontinuous evolutions as they keep on sampling their environment and 
passively transmit new practices. 
Evolution. Individual learning is more adaptive if an organization’s environment is 
frequently changing (McElreath et al., 2008). As practices change frequently, sampling the 
environment allows individual learners to constantly innovate and adapt faster than if they were 
imitating past behaviors.  
------------------------------------ 




The aim of this paper has been to suggest a novel typology of organizational changes, by 
opening the black box often used to represent change recipients. On this account, I have 
proposed a multi-level description (summarized in Figure 1) accounting for the dynamics of 
learning strategies and practices, as well as their interaction with the organizational 
environment. Moreover, I have built on past research on individual social learnings, in an 
attempt to increase the psychological plausibility of the processes I described. Finally, I have 
proposed to distinguish between four types of changes: revolution, late revolution, discrete 
evolution, and continuous evolution. While this paper is at an early stage, it should serve as a 
basis for a further identification of organizational change patterns. I will continue by outlining 
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the main contributions and limitations of this work and finish by suggesting potential avenues 
for future research. 
Theoretical Contributions 
First, I have emphasized the perspective of the organizational members in the context of 
organizational change. In so doing, I have described individuals as decision makers, who can 
choose between individual and social learning strategies. The multi-level dynamics are 
described in an attempt to contribute to the microfoundations of organizational change and 
open, at least partially, one of its black boxes (Lau & Woodman, 1995; Powell & Rerup, 2017). 
Not only have I included the decision strategies of the organizational members, but also the 
link between strategies and different environments, as well as their fitness. The resulting types 
of organizational change provide a basis for the identification of (i) responses to change and 
(ii) sources of change. 
 Second, the present framework aims at providing a more accurate picture of the 
individual processes underlying changes at the organizational level. It hence builds on evidence 
on organizational change and suggests a different typology of changes than the one identified 
by the literature. While a considerable amount of research has given attention to individuals 
facing changes (e.g., Bartunek & Moch, 1987; Dunham et al., 1989; Lau & Woodman, 1995; 
Oreg et al., 2018), the consideration of cognitive processes and relationships between 
organizational phenomena and individual processes remains scarce. In that regard, I have 
looked into the microfoundations of organizational change, that is, the processes unfolding 
when organizations and their members interact.  
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
I acknowledge several limitations of the proposed framework. First and foremost, for 
simplification purposes I have not described the various evolutionary paths that can unfold 
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from different types of social learning strategies, nor their comparison with individual learning 
strategies (see Boyd & Richerson 1985; McElreath, et al., 2008). Moreover, in order to 
establish a new typology, I have assumed that learning strategies are given exogenously and 
cannot change. Yet, the fitness of a strategy also decreases as the proportion of organizational 
members who rely on it increases (Laland, 2004). However, I intend to cover these in future 
work, and encourage future research to focus on these comparisons in order to further explore 
the microfoundations of organizational phenomena and open additional black boxes.  
 Second, I have left an important concept from the literature on organizational changes 
out of the debate: the attitudes toward change. While I acknowledge the importance of attitudes, 
I purposefully focused on decision-making strategies and environmental characteristics. 
However, it would be possible to extend this work to include change attitudes. For instance, 
Oreg et al. (2018) has argued that the source of change can impact the individual mechanisms 
of attitude generation. It is likely that individual learners hold positive attitudes toward changes, 
as they seek to innovate. On the contrary, one could make the argument that social learning is 
a strategy that should be adopted by organizational members who do not want to bear the costs 
of trial-and-error as they do not enjoy innovating.   
 Finally, although part of the literature is focusing on how to external forces can 
influence change processes (e.g., Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings, 2002), I have only 
considered organizational members as independent decision-makers. Furthermore, I have 
purposefully ignored any hierarchical notions that could take place within the organizations. 
However, I expect future research to investigate the role of hierarchy in learning. For instance, 
one could expect hierarchically higher organizational members to be more influential, and 
therefore to serve as role models to copy from. Yet, the existence of strong innovative figures 
can reduce the fitness of individual learning strategies for the other members (Barnard & Sibly, 
1981; Rogers, 1988) and foster social learning. 
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Implications for Practice 
This work has two main implications for practice. First, it points at the importance for 
an organization and its members to know their environment. Indeed, social learning is more 
adaptive in stable environments than in continuously changing ones. Second, it emphasizes the 
importance of having both social and individual learners in order to be adaptive: while social 
learners reduce the costs of the change process, they require a source of new ideas to copy 
from. 
Conclusions 
Although very tentative, this work draws on psychology and biology to open the black box of 
individual processes in the context of organizational change. By encompassing the interplay 
between an organization and its members, and how this interplay impacts organizational 
change, the suggested typology of organizational change should serve as a basis to identify 
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Appendix 
Figure 1: Interplay between individuals’ processes and practices, and their environment 
(adapted from Coleman 1994). 
Table 1: Typology of organizational changes, based on the organization’s environmental 




Social Revolution Maladaptation 
Individual Waste Evolution 
